REFINED COMPARATIVISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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David Fontana

This Article considers the possible uses of comparative constitutional law
in American constitutional interpretation. Surveying the debates about the uses
of comparative constitutional law at the Founding, and tracing these debates to
contemporary times by looking at the role of comparative constitutional law
in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court, David Fontana suggests that a
moderate, workable practice of using comparative constitutional law is consistent
with the original intention of the Founders and has some precedent in the case
law of the U.S. Supreme Court.
This Article lays out a “refined comparativist” approach, whereby a court
would consider comparative constitutional law only when faced with a “hard
case,” the comparative constitutional law can add something distinctive to
American constitutional interpretation, and the contextual differences between
the United States and the country the American court is considering borrowing
from are slight. This Article then defends this refined comparativist model,
paying particular attention to several strands of contemporary constitutional
scholarship, before applying refined comparativism to address the constitutionality of hate speech.
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INTRODUCTION
In his memoirs, entitled Present at the Creation,1 Dean Acheson
described the feeling at the State Department in the aftermath of World
War II:
In a sense the postwar years were a period of creation . . . . Moreover,
the state of the world in those years and almost all that happened
during them was wholly novel within the experience of those who
had to deal with it . . . . [F]or those who acted this drama did not
2
know, nor do any of us yet know, the end.

1.
DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE
DEPARTMENT (1969).
2.
Id. at xvii.
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A similar feeling echoes throughout American constitutional scholarship as it decides what to make of the “rise of world constitutionalism.”3
Never before has American constitutional scholarship seriously considered
advocating the use of comparative constitutional law4 in American constitutional cases. Now, some scholars are finally focusing on the age-old issue
of legal borrowing within the American constitutional context. Being “present at the creation,”5 Acheson reminds us, means one does not know what
will happen in the future. This Article argues that the future should
6
include an extension of the study of legal transplants to the constitutional
context: American courts, in deciding constitutional cases, should sometimes refer to comparative constitutional law materials.
A number of U.S. Supreme Court opinions, authored by various Justices, have referred to comparative constitutional law materials.7 However,
while the role of international law in domestic courts has been a subject
8
of great interest in the academic literature, there has been no American
3.
Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997).
4.
An important question to answer in looking at the role of comparative constitutional
“law” in American constitutionalism is what exactly is the “law” that judges can look to in foreign
countries? Traditionally, comparative law has focused only on legal texts in foreign countries.
Thus, leading comparativists, like Rodolfo Sacco and Günter Frankenberg in Europe, and Alan
Watson in the United States, focused on comparative legal texts. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 9 (1974); Günter Frankenberg, Critical
Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1985); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal
Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991). As William
Ewald describes it, comparative legal scholars have typically believed that “law includes statutes
and case reports and decisions of administrative agencies—that is, the sorts of things that working
attorneys characteristically consult in their day-to-day practice. But law does not include, except
peripherally, legal history or the writings of philosophers, or the speculations of academics.”
William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1889, 2107 (1995).
The judge interested in comparative constitutional law would be well advised to try to abide
by this focus on legal texts and look mostly or only at written legal documents—legislation, judicial opinions—because the judge is best trained to read and understand those documents. The
judge looking for insights on how a law in a foreign country has worked in actuality can look for
information on that in formal legal documents, but also could look to studies of comparative
constitutional sociology. As a general rule, however, the refined comparativist judge should stick
to the examination of formal texts because “a full comparison . . . of any two legal systems . . . requires the use of techniques unfamiliar to lawyers.” RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 70 (1996).
5.
ACHESON, supra note 1.
6.
WATSON, supra note 4. By legal transplants, I mean borrowing legal ideas, doctrines,
and other legal information from foreign countries.
7.
Infra notes 20–43 and accompanying text.
8.
The leading articles in this area of scholarship include, for example, Curtis A. Bradley,
Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529
(1999); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley, The
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scholarship examining when and how judges should use the constitutional
insights of other countries. Indeed, there are many casebooks that examine
constitutional development in other individual countries,9 or constitutional
10
development in all countries, but the debate about legal transplants does
not appear in constitutional scholarship, with the exception of a handful of
recent articles: Mark Tushnet’s article on the criteria for measuring the
success of constitutional borrowings11 and on the propriety of constitutional
borrowings into American constitutional law based on certain legal theo12
ries, Sujit Choudhry’s article examining the different styles of comparative
constitutional law reasoning in countries around the world,13 and articles
that examine the wisdom of constitutional borrowings in specific doctrinal
contexts (such as Christopher McCrudden’s article looking at the uses of
comparative law in human rights jurisprudence,14 and Vicki Jackson’s
articles on the uses of comparative constitutional law to resolve different
15
doctrinal issues in American constitutional law ). In other words, no
scholar has yet directly posed the important question: Should American
constitutional law borrow from comparative constitutional law? In this
Article, the question is posed and then answered by building upon a latent
practice in American constitutional adjudication: American judges have
occasionally been using, and should continue to use, comparative
constitutional law in a certain kind of way, a way I call “refined
comparativism.” This Article systematizes and provides a workable
framework to improve upon this history of refined comparativism by
suggesting criteria for when it should be used, how it can be used so that
Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000); and David M. Golove,
Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty
Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
9.
E.g., DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1997); ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1992).
10.
MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1979); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999);
WALTER F. MURPHY & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1977).
11.
Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying
Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 324 (1998).
12.
Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225
(1999).
13.
Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999).
14.
Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial
Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 499 (2000).
15.
Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up
the Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583 (1999) [hereinafter Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance]; Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities
and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 2001 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming).
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it is as efficacious as possible, and why American judges ruling on
constitutional matters should care about comparative constitutional law at
all.
Part I of this Article catalogs the ways in which comparative constitutional law can be used in American judicial decisions. This Part looks at the
different styles of comparative constitutional reasoning, and the different
roles that such reasoning can play in the legal argument of a judicial
opinion. In order to form a common language to better explain what
exactly the Article is defending, this Part highlights the various ways in
which one can use comparative constitutional law in American judicial
decisions. Before arguing that the Court should and can “use” comparative
constitutional law in a particular way, this Part attempts to show the various ways in which courts can “use” comparative constitutional law. Part I
also begins to show that in fact the Court in a wide range of cases has
already used comparative constitutional law.
Part II of this Article introduces the idea of “refined comparativism,” a
type of rulebook about when American courts adjudicating constitutional
cases should use comparative constitutional law and how they should
structure the process of legal borrowing within the context of a trial or an
appeal. Parts I and II together constitute the essence of “refined comparativism.” Part I discusses the various ways an American court deciding
a constitutional issue can use comparative constitutional law, and Part II
discusses when it is appropriate for an American court to use comparative
constitutional law and how a court should go about using comparative
constitutional law to make up for possible institutional limitations.
The next three Parts defend this vision of refined comparativism,
demonstrating that it has historical support, fits with several important
schools of contemporary constitutional scholarship, and will add something
to contemporary American constitutional law. Part III discusses some of
the benefits of refined comparativism. Part IV demonstrates that the version of refined comparativism sketched in Parts II and III in fact has some
historical support. Focusing mostly on the Founding and on Supreme Court
decisions, American constitutional law has from the outset used comparative constitutional law, both in the writing of the Constitution and in
its interpretation. Part V tests the acceptability of the vision of refined
comparativism, not according to original constitutional intention or subsequent practice, but rather according to various contemporary theoretical
approaches to American constitutional law.
After sketching this vision of refined comparativism and defending it,
Part VI then turns to a particular case and applies refined comparativism to
illustrate the virtues it can have. Part VI applies the refined comparativist
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method implicit in past cases to one particular case, R.A.V. v. St. Paul,16 a
case dealing with the constitutionality of a state hate crimes statute. Part
VII refutes some potential criticisms of the refined comparativist vision,
normative and pragmatic.

I. TYPOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW USES
Before we can examine whether American judges should cite to and
use comparative constitutional law, and how they can do so most effectively, we must first examine the different styles of comparative constitutional reasoning in American constitutional law and the different roles
that these styles of reasoning can play in the legal structure of a judicial
decision. This Part focuses on exactly what role comparative constitutional
law could play in a judicial decision, and on the different general styles of
comparative constitutional reasoning. Of course, there are many different
versions of comparative constitutional “law” that American judges can look
to—formal legal texts, studies of law in action, and so on.17
A. A History of the Uses of Comparative Constitutional Law
in American Judicial Opinions
The enterprise of comparing the laws of different countries is not at all
new. Aristotle and Solon engaged in perhaps the first examples of comparative legal study, and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the
Societe de Legislation Compare in France and the Society of Comparative
Legislation in England engaged in lengthy studies of the legislation of different countries. In the American context, since the beginning of the
Republic there has been an effort to spread the American constitutional
philosophy around the world. As A.E. Dick Howard and I have attempted
to show, this “constitutional advising” has taken on many different forms
over the course of American history.18 However long Americans have been
willing to make constitutional suggestions to others, they have very rarely
been willing to listen to others’ constitutional suggestions. This provincialism stands alone now that, with the end of the Cold War, the traffic in
constitutional ideas in most countries includes both imports and exports
16.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
17.
Supra note 4.
18.
A.E. Dick Howard & David Fontana, The Changing Role of the American Constitutional Advisor (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
ABROAD (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990) (cataloging the influence of the U.S.
Constitution on different countries’ constitutional systems).
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from other sophisticated liberal constitutional democracies. The South
African Bill of Rights, for example, empowers that country’s courts to look
abroad when interpreting it.19
Despite the resistance of American constitutional scholarship to consider constitutional borrowings, the Supreme Court has in fact not demonstrated all that much “ambivalent resistance”20 to using comparative
constitutional law. The Court has been using comparative constitutional
law from its inception, despite well-publicized remarks21 like Justice
22
Antonin Scalia’s argument in Printz v. United States that “comparative
analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though
it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one,”23 to which Justice
Stephen Breyer, the Court’s most ardent comparative constitutionalist,
responded that comparative constitutional law “may . . . cast an empirical
light on the consequences of different legal solutions to a common legal
problem.”24
Indeed, almost every Justice now on the Court has used comparative
constitutional law in their opinions. Although these usages of comparative
constitutional law differ both in their general style of reasoning and in their
exact role in the Justices’ opinions, the willingness of the Court to occasionally look abroad at the same time American constitutional scholarship

19.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 39(1)(b)–(c) (defining the use of foreign and public
international law); id. ch. 14, § 231 (defining the mechanisms used to determine the legal status
of international agreements). The interim Constitution of South Africa included similar provisions. S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 35(a); id. ch. 14, § 231. Indeed, in one of its most
important opinions to date, State v. Makwanyane, Judgment of June 6, 1995 (State v.
Makwanyane and Another), Constitutional Court No. CCT/3/94, at 3808-B-09a, the South
African Constitutional Court made reference to the constitutional opinions of other courts.
President Arthur Chaskalson’s opinion alone discusses rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, e.g., id.
at 405G-06D, 410G-I n.35, 415F-17B, 420E-F, 421E-22D, 434F; the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, e.g., id. at 432D-E, 432F-G; the California Supreme Court, e.g., id. at 432E-F,
434F-G, 445E; the Hungarian Constitutional Court, e.g., id. at 429H-30F; the German
Constitutional Court, e.g., id. at 406A, 423B-C, 438B-F, 446G, 448A; the Privy Council, e.g., id.
at 420I n.3; the Canadian Supreme Court, e.g., id. at 406A-B, 423D-24A-E, 436G-38B; the
Tanzanian Court of Appeals, e.g., id. at 440H-41F; the Supreme Court of India, e.g., id. at 406BC, 426G-29C; the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, e.g., id. at 402H-I n.3, 452I n.170; the European
Court of Human Rights, e.g., id. at 406D, 425F-26A, 429D, 438F-39E; and the United Nations
Committee on Human Rights, e.g., id. at 406D, 424E-25F, 429E-G.
20.
Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, supra note 15, at 589 (noting how the Court has been
“sometimes silently, sometimes expressly” resistant to using comparative constitutional law).
21.
See Linda Greenhouse, Appealing to the Law’s Brooding Spirit, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1997,
at E4.
22.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
23.
Id. at 921 n.11.
24.
Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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has hardly even noticed developments around the world is surprising.25
Most recently, in deciding not to hear an appeal of two death penalty cases
that raised the issue of whether an undue delay prior to execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, Justices Breyer and Clarence
Thomas engaged in another debate about the uses of comparative
constitutional law. Justice Breyer argued that the “Court has long
considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts
have applied standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional
standards in roughly comparable circumstances . . . . I believe their views
are useful even though not binding.”26 Justice Thomas, concurring in the
denial of certiorari, argued that “were there any such support in our own
jurisprudence [for Breyer’s argument], it would be unnecessary”27 for Breyer
to look abroad for the answer to the case before the Court.
Justice David Souter looked to Dutch constitutional practice in
Washington v. Glucksberg28 to examine arguments presented to the Court
about the means-end fit of the legislation at issue.29 Justice John Paul
Stevens has used comparative constitutional law to decide whether a particular American legal practice was “cruel and unusual.”30 In Thompson
31
v. Oklahoma, Justice Stevens noted that the Court should look to
“other nations”32 to confirm that it would “offend civilized standards of

25.
Ackerman, supra note 3, at 772 (“[T]he global transformation [of constitutionalism] has
not yet had the slightest impact on American constitutional thought.”). In fairness to many
scholars, Bruce Ackerman’s lecture was published in 1997, well before the publication of the
important Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet casebook and other leading articles in the field.
26.
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997–98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
27.
Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
28.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
29.
Id. at 785–87 (Souter, J., concurring).
30.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
31.
487 U.S. 815 (1988). This method of using comparative constitutional law to decide
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment can be traced back to Justice Arthur Goldberg’s
dissent from a denial of certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), in which he asserted that “[i]n light of the trend . . . throughout
this world” the practice at issue should be struck down. Justice Goldberg made reference to a
United Nations survey on the laws, regulations, and practices of countries around the world. Id.
at 890–91. He argued that the combination of overwhelming international disapproval of the
practice at issue, plus the McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), plea to interpret
constitutions in an evolutionary manner, means that the practice at issue violates “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of [our] maturing society.” Id. at 890 (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
32.
Id. at 830 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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decency”33 to execute juveniles before age sixteen.34 Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg also joined an opinion making reference to comparative
constitutional law.35
Chief Justice William Rehnquist cited to comparative constitutional
law on abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,36 and argued in the first lineitem veto case, Raines v. Byrd,37 that looking at foreign systems of standing
helped show how an American statute might not be “irrational”38 because
foreign systems “operate[d] under one or another variant of . . . a [similar]
39
regime.” Justice Scalia, the critic of comparative constitutional law in
Printz, has in fact used comparative constitutional law in his other
opinions.40 Justice Anthony Kennedy has used comparative constitutional

33.
Id.
34.
For a type of negative constitutional comparativism in Justice John Paul Stevens’s
opinions, a form of reasoning I will discuss infra note 59 and accompanying text, see, for example,
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 507–08 n.6 (1990), which analogized South African and Nazi
Germany precedents to current efforts to determine race for legal purposes, and California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting), which recognized search and seizure
rules as “bulwark[s] against police practices that prevail in totalitarian regimes.”
35.
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by
Ginsburg, J.) (concluding that the current U.S. Supreme Court First Amendment doctrine
“is consistent with that of other constitutional courts facing similarly complex constitutional
problems” and looking to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the Canadian
Supreme Court).
36.
505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing to abortion decisions by the West German Constitutional Court and by the
Canadian Supreme Court).
37.
521 U.S. 811 (1997).
38.
Id. at 828.
39.
Id.
40.
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the Eighth Amendment case that
prompted Justice Stevens to use comparative constitutional law, Justice Antonin Scalia argued
that:
The practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident,
but rather “so implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” that it occupies a place not
merely in our mores . . . [but] in our Constitution as well.
Id. at 868–69 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia later states that “it is a
Constitution of the United States of America we are expounding.” Id. at 869; see also McIntyre v.
Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 381 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
prohibition of anonymous campaign speech in foreign democracies supports prohibition in the
United States). For a form of what I shall call “genealogical comparativism,” or comparison based
upon some form of historical linkage, see Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996), a case in
which the Justices fought over the relevant scope of congressional and presidential power in
determining the punishment for court martials. Scalia argued that English law at the time of the
Founding could sometimes be relevant, although not in that particular case. Id. at 775–76
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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law in his opinions.41 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has used comparative
constitutional reasoning,42 as has Justice Thomas.43
Off the bench, members of the Court have started to confer with
44
members of constitutional courts in other countries and have spoken of
the need to incorporate comparative constitutional law into American
constitutional law. At a press conference after meeting with members of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), Justice O’Connor stated that she
would be willing to consult ECJ decisions “and perhaps use them and cite
them in future decisions.”45 Justice O’Connor has elsewhere urged
American lawyers appearing before the Court to cite to foreign law.46
Justice Breyer, matching his advocacy of using comparative constitutional
law in his decisions, stated in the ECJ press conference with Justice
O’Connor that “[l]awyers in America may cite an EU ruling to our court to
further a point, and this increases the cross-fertilization of U.S.-E.U.

41.
Justice Anthony Kennedy has also employed negative constitutional borrowing. See,
e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (finding that racial reapportionment “bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid”); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633
n.1 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (invoking race-conscious definitions used in Nazi Germany
and South Africa).
42.
For example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor used a form of comparative constitutional
law reasoning by referring to the Nuremberg Tribunals as a relevant precedent not because of their
role in international law but rather because they represented the experience of a court in a foreign
land. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing the Nuremberg Tribunals as precedent).
43.
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 907 n.14 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (looking to
the voting systems of many countries to assess the constitutional status of the American voting
system).
44.
Yale Law School’s annual Global Constitutionalism Seminar brings together judges
from courts with constitutional jurisdiction from around the world. Judges have also traveled
around the world to meet with each other in each other’s courtrooms. For example, in July 1998,
a U.S. delegation that included Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Kennedy, and
O’Connor traveled to meet with European judges. Stephen J. Breyer, Changing Relationships
Among European Constitutional Courts, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045, 1061 n.1 (2000).
45.
Elizabeth Greathouse, Justices See Joint Issues with the EU, WASH. POST, July 9, 1998,
at A24 (reporting on a press briefing at which Justices O’Connor and Breyer asserted that
they might use and cite decisions by the European Court of Justice). Justice O’Connor has
also led the Justices to meet their foreign counterparts, first from the French Conseil d’Etat, the
Conseil Constitutonnel, and the Cour de Casssation, and most recently from the European Court of
Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the German Constitutional Court. In
addition, following the tragedy of September 11, 2001, in New York City, Pennsylvania, and
Washington, D.C., Justice O’Connor alluded to international and comparative law in telling a
New York University School of Law audience that “[i]t is possible, if not likely, that we will rely
more on international rules of war than on our cherished constitutional standards for criminal
prosecutions in responding to threats to our national security.” Linda Greenhouse, In New York
Visit, O’Connor Foresees Limits on Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5.
46.
E.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Our Shrinking World: Why Lawyers Need International
Awareness, Keynote Address to the Union Internationale des Advocates (Sept. 3, 1997).
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ideas.”47 Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking at a ceremony marking the
fortieth anniversary of the German Basic Law, remarked that:
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States exercising
the power of judicial review had no precedents to look to save their
own, because our courts alone exercised this sort of authority. When
many new constitutional courts were created after the Second World
War, these courts naturally looked to decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States, among other sources, for developing their own
law. But now that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many
countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking
to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own
deliberative process. The United States courts, and legal scholarship
in our country generally, have been somewhat laggard in relying on
comparative law and decisions of other countries. But I predict that
with so many thriving constitutional courts in the world
48
today . . . that approach will be changed in the near future.

Following the lead of the Supreme Court, other American courts have
used comparative constitutional law. Judge Guido Calabresi of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has looked abroad for answers
to difficult American constitutional questions,49 hoping for an “on-going
dialogue between the adjudicative bodies of the world community.”50 Other
lower court judges have looked to comparative constitutional law in their
opinions51 or in their off-the-bench writings.52
47.
48.

Greathouse, supra note 45 (quoting Justice Breyer).
William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks (1989), reprinted in
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN
SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993). Chief Justice William
Rehnquist’s argument, that until recently very few countries had viable constitutional regimes, is
disputable, although most scholars seem to share this opinion. E.g., CAPPELLETTI & COHEN,
supra note 10, at 13–16 (1979) (arguing that comparative constitutional law only became viable
after World War II).
49.
United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
50.
Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1995).
51.
For example, in United States v. Hall, 34 M.J. 695 (A.C.M.R. 1991), the U.S. Court of
Military Review was forced to examine a case involving issues related to sodomy and the right
to privacy. The court, using comparative constitutional law in what I shall call the “context” way,
noted that “[t]he debate and uncertainty over the right to privacy are not purely American.
‘There has been a sort of judical trans-Atlantic volley in privacy law . . . . Until the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights joined in on this side most of the smashes were coming
from the United States.’” Id. at 697 n.2 (quoting J. Michel, Homosexuals and Privacy, 138 NEW
L.J. 831 (1988)).
52.
Shirley Abrahmson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World’s a Courtroom: Judging in the
New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273 (1997); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1996). Chief Justice Shirley Abrahmson sits on the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, and Judge Richard Posner sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
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B.

Typology of Past Usage

1.

General Styles of Reasoning

An American court can use comparative constitutional law in one of
two ways, depending on the relationship that the court attempts to argue
exists between the “lender” country and the United States: (1) genealogical
53
comparativism or (2) ahistorical comparativism. In a system of genealogical
comparativism, a court indicates that it looks to comparative constitutional
law because some relationship exists between the lender country—the
country supplying the idea or fact the American court is considering
borrowing—and the United States.
Genealogical comparativism makes sure to note that one of the central
reasons that the American court looks to comparative constitutional law is
because of the historical, legal, and/or cultural relationship between that
country and the United States. The most frequent use of comparative constitutional law in American constitutional adjudication arises when courts
use a thin genealogical comparativism rationale, usually in the context of
studying English legal history: This is the system we come from, therefore
this is who we are, therefore this is relevant to interpreting our
Constitution. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Loving v. United States54 illustrates this type of reasoning. In order to understand the power of Congress
and of the president in determining the punishment for court martials,
Justice Kennedy argued, we must examine the comparative constitutional
law of England because our system derives from the English system.55 Of
course, the obvious question posed by genealogical comparativism is how
broadly to extend “genealogy”—what countries do we have a sufficiently
close relationship with to justify constitutional borrowing? As will be discussed in Part III.B, the Court has grappled with this problem for some
time. One of the many reasons American constitutional adjudication
should use comparative constitutional law is because courts should have a
thicker sense of genealogical comparativism—courts should be more aware
that there are important historical, cultural, and legal relationships between
the United States and other countries besides eighteenth and preeighteenth century England.56
53.
I am of course not the first to talk about genealogical legal arguments—scholars like
Sujit Choudhry have mentioned it in passing. Choudhry, supra note 13, at 865. My contribution
in this Article is to describe genealogical argumentation in detail, systematizing it in the context
of comparative constitutional argumentation.
54.
517 U.S. 748 (1996).
55.
Id. at 759–67.
56.
Infra Part III.B.
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I will call the other form of comparative constitutional law reasoning
in American opinions ahistorical comparativism. In this type of reasoning,
although a historical, cultural, and legal relationship may exist between the
lender country and the United States, this relationship does not form the
basis for the constitutional borrowing. Rather, the American court looks to
the constitutional solution of the other country for its own sake, regardless
of that country’s historical, legal, and cultural similarity with the United
States.
Another important distinction must be drawn between positive comparativism and negative comparativism.57 Positive comparativism involves
an American court looking to comparative constitutional law with
approval, looking to see if American constitutional law can borrow from
58
comparative constitutional law.
By contrast, negative comparativism
looks to comparative constitutional law as a way of devising principles of
American constitutional law by testing what it is not.
Negative
comparativism involves looking to the failures (from the American
perspective) of other constitutional regimes.59
57.
This distinction should be viewed as separate from the distinction introduced above
between genealogical comparativism and ahistorical comparativism. Thus, an American court
can use comparative constitutional law using both genealogical comparativism and positive/negative comparativism. Likewise, a court can use comparative constitutional law using both
ahistorical comparativism and positive/negative comparativism.
58.
Justice Breyer’s opinions in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976–78 (1997)
(Breyer, J., dissenting), and Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994–98, (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari), are examples of positive comparativism.
59.
This notion of negative comparativism has similarities with the concepts developed in
two articles unrelated to comparative constitutional borrowing. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological
Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985) (discussing the “pathological
perspective,” or the use of worst-case scenarios, in the context of the First Amendment); Richard
A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998) (discussing the use of
anti-canons, or cases that serve as examples of particularly poor legal reasoning).
The U.S. Supreme Court has made reference to a number of failures or undesirable aspects of
other constitutional regimes. For example, the Court in the last decade or so alone has used negative comparativism to make arguments that certain systems resemble apartheid and are therefore
anathema to the U.S. Constitution. E.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (finding that
racial reapportionment “bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid”); see also
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 n.1 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (invoking
race-conscious definitions used in Nazi Germany and South Africa); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474, 507–08 n.6 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (analogizing South Africa and Nazi Germany
precedents to current efforts to determine race for legal purposes).
Negative comparativism has been most frequently used to analogize to restrictions on artistic,
cultural, or political freedoms in other countries that would “obviously” be unacceptable in
the American system. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“[T]he
totalitarian state[s] in our own times . . . have censored musical compositions to serve the needs of
the state.”); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353 (1976) (noting that the patronage system was
associated with the Nazi rise to power); Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924, 926–27
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that freedom of speech sets the United States apart from
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Role in the Legal Argument of a Judicial Opinion

What role can comparative constitutional law play within the legal
argument of a judicial opinion? Before discussing when and how an
American court should cite to comparative constitutional law, we must
examine what exactly the court is using comparative constitutional law to do
in its opinion. Previous experimentation with comparative constitutional
law has highlighted three different ways a court can use it: (1) in dicta, (2)
to create a workable principle of law, or (3) to prove a “constitutional
fact.”60
A court using comparative constitutional law in dicta can do so in a
number of ways. First of all, the court can simply use the comparative constitutional law as a way of providing context to the discussion of the facts
and of the law relating to the facts. Chief Justice Rehnquist in Washington
v. Glucksberg,61 for instance, uses comparative constitutional law simply to
show that the issue the Court is addressing is one that many people are
talking about around the world.62 Courts can use comparative constitutional law in dicta to recommend the adoption of a particular rule of
law or principle, or to note a relevant constitutional fact yet not make this
constitutional fact part of the decision. In this way, the courts are using
comparative constitutional law the same way detailed below, but without
totalitarian countries); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 764–65 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (accusing the majority of allowing a chilling effect of surveillance of the sort associated
with “totalitarian countries”); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 62 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part) (finding no logical distinction between the actions of the police at issue and those “usually
associated with totalitarian police”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting a “poignant” argument for academic freedom in South
Africa); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (claiming that the availability of the writ
of habeas corpus is “one of the decisively differentiating factors between our democracy and totalitarian governments”); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 381 (1951) (Black, J., concurring)
(warning of the use in Argentina of congressional investigating committees to suppress dissident
newspapers); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“The right to speak freely and to
promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart
from totalitarian regimes.”).
60.
See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11–12
(1998) (calling for the Supreme Court to pay more attention to deciding cases based on relevant
“constitutional facts”). By constitutional facts, I am using the term in a manner identical to the
way it is used by Judge Posner: Constitutional facts are those facts that can be discovered by
observing experience (legal and otherwise) to answer a particular legal question posed by a case.
For instance, Judge Posner argues that the Supreme Court should have used constitutional facts
to assess the true equality of rival educational institutions at issue in United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996). Posner, supra, at 12–20.
61.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
62.
Id. at 718 n.16. For another example of comparative constitutional law as context
in dicta, see CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 158 n.9 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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making the use of comparative constitutional law part of the actual decision
of the court.63 This Article will be much more concerned with the use of
64
comparative constitutional law to create rules and standards, or to help
find constitutional facts, than with its use as constitutional dicta.
Courts can also use comparative constitutional law to create rules of
law or principles to be applied by subsequent courts, legislatures, and executives. This use of comparative constitutional law can be roughly analogized
to Kenneth Culp Davis’s notion of “legislative facts.”65 Davis defined legislative facts as follows: “When an agency [or court] wrestles with a question
of law or policy, it is acting legislatively . . . and the facts which inform its
legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts.”66
A court uses comparative constitutional law as a legislative fact to help it
find a workable rule or standard to apply in the case before it and in future
cases.67 A court may use comparative constitutional law as “legislative fact”
in many different situations.68 First of all, a court may find this use of comparative constitutional law helpful when it is addressing an issue for the first
time, and there are no helpful American judicial precedents. Here, using
comparative constitutional law allows an American court to benefit from
the accumulated experience and wisdom of another country and of the
faster legal or extralegal evolution that has led to the resolution of the issue
there more quickly than in this country. This approach to solving new
issues is particularly appropriate in the judicial setting, in which courts are
acting with few fact-finding powers and in an increasingly complex world,
and so can particularly benefit from borrowing a principle that has already
between tried and tested.69 Second of all, a court creating a rule or standard
63.
For interesting discussions of the role of dicta, see, for example, Michael C. Dorf, Dicta
and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 (1994); and Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998).
64.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
65.
Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942).
66.
Id.
67.
A court may use the experience of “law in action” in other countries to help it see
which principle would work, or may look to the principle that a foreign country has applied to
help it come up with a principle. Again, as discussed supra note 4, refined comparativist judges
should generally stick to looking at formal legal texts—judicial opinions, constitutional text—and
if they can glean insights about how the law has actually worked from those opinions, then it
would be less objectionable for them to use that information then it would be for them to use an
article on comparative legal sociology, for example.
68.
The ideal situation for using comparative constitutional law, of course, would be when
all of the situations described in this discussion exist—indeed, this is the paradigmatic example of
refined comparativism, discussed below.
69.
For a discussion of this notion of the virtues of borrowing from comparative experience,
see infra Part III.
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may use comparative constitutional law when the American sources are
unclear, and therefore the constitutional answer to the question before the
court is hard to find. Justice Breyer’s opinion in Printz essentially uses this
approach.70 Breyer argues that the issue posed by Printz is complicated and
that the American sources are unclear, therefore the Court should look
abroad. In these cases, comparative constitutional law can help settle difficult American constitutional questions by providing more evidence and
information. Finally, an American court crafting a rule or standard may use
comparative constitutional law to help it bridge the “concept” and “conception” distinction.71 The American sources may be clear enough to help
guide the court somewhat (providing the court with a “concept”), but not
clear enough to help the court come up with a workable rule or standard to
be applied in the case before the court and in future cases (“conception”).
Judge Calabresi’s opinion in United States v. Then72 provides an example
of this use of comparative constitutional law. Calabresi essentially argued
that the American constitutional tradition helped us find a relevant
“concept” but comparative constitutional law can help us find a workable
rule or standard, the “conception,” in this case the notion of suspensive
vetoes utilized in Italy and Germany.73
Last of all, a court can use comparative constitutional law to help it
prove a relevant constitutional fact. This frequently involves “law canvassing”74—looking to the laws of many countries to help define a term or assess
70.
Justice Breyer’s Printz dissent seems to argue that the American sources on federal
commandeering of state executives are unclear—the constitutional text is ambiguous, and there
are no clear precedents. Therefore, to help the Court reach a decision, it should use comparative
constitutional insights to pick a solution that works. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71.
I borrow this notion of “concepts,” or broader goals, and of “conceptions,” or specific
formulations of those goals, from a number of contemporary thinkers. STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD
DWORKIN 29 (2d ed. 1997) (“Dworkin makes frequent use of a distinction between concepts and
conceptions.”); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE ch. 5 (1971). The terms have their origin
in W.E.B. Gallie, 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soc’y 167 (1965).
72.
56 F.3d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
73.
Id.
74.
By law canvassing, I mean using the laws of different jurisdictions to help prove a relevant constitutional fact. Justice Byron White in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), for
example, looked to the laws of various states to determine the moral sentiments of Americans
regarding sodomy. Id. at 192–96. A complete law canvassing in constitutional law requires the
judge to look at state laws, another “intertextual” source of constitutional meaning. Because they
are domestic sources of constitutional meaning, the judge should use that form of law canvassing
prior to using comparative law canvassing. Indeed, this Article does not argue, and it is not essential for the vision of refined comparativism introduced in this Article, that comparative constitutional law be the primary source of “comparative” or “intertextual” insight. Thus, I fully agree
with the observations of some that state constitutional law should be the “true” source of comparative constitutional insight. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Comparative Constitutional Law,
American Style (Jan. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). This Article argues
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the rationality or acceptability of a legal practice. This constitutional fact
use of comparative constitutional law has been particularly common in
cases deciding whether or not a particular legal practice was “cruel and
unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.75 Another common use of comparative constitutional law is to help with the judicial analysis of relevant
constitutional facts that arise in assessing a means-end fit. To see whether a
given end is compelling, a court can see how the “end” has worked in other
countries, or can look at other countries to see whether the means used will
actually further the end, or if there are other alternatives to reach that end
that have worked in other countries. Justice Souter’s Washington v.
Glucksberg76 opinion uses comparative constitutional law in this way,
studying Dutch constitutional practice surrounding euthanasia to argue that
a given means would not produce a certain end because of the Dutch experience with a similar program.77 Also, if it is not considered pure dicta context, as mentioned above, courts can be said to use comparative
constitutional law to show that a given practice at issue in a case is not
entirely irrational. Rehnquist’s opinion in the first line-item veto case,
stating that a different practice of constitutional standing would not be

that comparative constitutional law can help judges decide constitutional cases. This Article
leaves for another day the question of where on the list of relevant sources—beyond traditional
sources—comparative constitutional law would rank.
For the purposes of this Article, however, the sole argument is the rather uncontroversial
point that comparative constitutional law, although less relevant than mainstream traditional
sources of meaning—text, history—still matters. Comparative constitutional law, among secondary sources of constitutional meaning, is particularly appropriate for the reasons presented in
many places in this Article. Infra Part III. Thus, refined comparativism has obvious similarities
with Myres McDougal’s version of eclectic interpretive methodology. See LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE
passim (2d ed. 2000) (discussing McDougal’s jurisprudential approach). Unlike McDougal’s version, however, refined comparativism does visualize a clear hierarchy of relevant interpretive
sources, and comparative constitutional law (though not one of the most directly relevant
sources) is important to understand and use from time to time because it is a source of particular
relevance and utility. Infra Part III.
75.
This was the issue in the Knight v. Florida opinions by Justices Clarence Thomas and
Breyer discussing the Court’s denial of certiorari in a death penalty case. See also Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (discussing the
execution of juveniles); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796–97 n.22 (1982) (discussing the
elimination of restrictions on felony murder in England, India, Canada, and a “number of other
Commonwealth countries”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958) (noting that only two
of eighty-four countries surveyed used denationalization as a penalty for desertion). See supra
note 31.
76.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
77.
Id. at 785–87 (Souter, J., concurring).
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“irrational,”78 is an example of this use of comparative constitutional law to
help prove a constitutional fact.79

II. REFINED COMPARATIVISM: THE FRAMEWORK
Given that courts can use comparative constitutional law in the ways
outlined in Part I, how can the trial and appeal process be structured to help
a judge use comparative constitutional law in an accurate, effective manner? When should a judge use comparative constitutional law? This Part
will discuss when a judge should consider using comparative constitutional
law, and how the judge should go about using comparative constitutional
law within a trial or appeal.
A judge should consider using comparative constitutional law when
the American sources do not provide a clear answer to a question the judge
must answer (whether factual or legal). The judge should use the comparative legal materials only if the contextual differences are relatively minimal—
if the problems faced by importing a solution or fact from another country
are relatively insignificant. The judge should then consider whether the
comparative materials have any comparative advantages, the paradigmatic
case of when comparativism would be appropriate, or simply provide
another “data point”80 (factual or legal). Within the framework of
a trial or appeal, a judge should encourage litigants to argue comparative
constitutional law to courts (when appropriate), sometimes even using
expert witnesses on foreign law who can help the judge determine the
relevant comparative constitutional law and its transferability. Judges who
78.
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997).
79.
This can be particularly helpful when the important issue in the case is whether a particular practice before the Court is “reasonable.” Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 570–
71 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the practice of other nations, including Great
Britain and Australia, supported the reasonableness, and hence the constitutionality, of a minimum wage law for women that the Court struck down). The power of the state end advanced and
the appropriateness of the means the state used to further that end are also examples of the possible use of comparative constitutional facts. Also, a court concerned about the larger implications
and consequences of its actions (and a court that uses this type of consequential reasoning in its
decisions) can look to comparative constitutional law. For example, Mark Tushnet has suggested
that we could use comparative constitutional law to help judges decide about the threat posed
by their own potential judicial activism. Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 249
(1995) (stating that “[w]ith the spread of constitutional review throughout the world, we now
have a larger base of information on which to rest judgments about” the potential threats to
democratic decisionmaking raised by judicial review).
80.
For a discussion of the idea of “data points” within the context of legal studies, see, for
example, David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 331 (1994).
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use comparative constitutional law and solicit expert witnesses to help
them do so will encourage litigants to argue and brief foreign law, thereby
making the judicial use of comparative constitutional law more accurate
because it will be based on a number of different sources.
A. When a Court Should Consider Using Comparative
Constitutional Law
Comparative constitutional law should be viewed as a form of persuasive authority, or authority that attracts adherence as opposed to obliging
81
82
it. As Justice Breyer noted in Knight v. Florida, comparative constitutional law can be “useful even though not binding.”83 Viewed in this light,
comparative constitutional law does not overwhelm all of the other potential
sources of constitutional law in a judicial ruling. It just provides an
additional source to help courts deal with “hard cases.”84 When the higherorder sources of constitutional meaning (text, for instance)—which I have
81.
This view of some sources as persuasive rather than obligatory poses obvious problems
for judicial discretion. If a judge has no obligation to use a source that we call “persuasive,” then
he or she might use it in a selective and inconsistent matter. This could be one plausible objection to refined comparativism—is there enough of a guide as to when judges should use comparative constitutional law, or will they simply use it when it supports their argument? This does not
mean that one should not recognize the existence of persuasive authority, but rather should be
vigilant in critiquing the principled and consistent use of such authority by judges.
There can be basically two main objections related to judicial capacity and refined comparativism. The first objection is the general objection to judicial discretion that arises whenever one
talks about a new form of judicial power. I have several responses to this argument. First, refined
comparativism is not a dangerous form of judicial discretion. It is actually one way of further limiting how a judge deals with a hard case. Second, we must recognize that judges have been using
comparative constitutional law for a while, and will continue to do so, and it is better to talk
openly about this usage so we can talk openly about principled limitations. Third, refined
comparativism is not necessarily a prohibitively expensive and time-consuming form of judging.
With the assistance of litigants and experts, a judge may actually find it a less expensive and more
principled way to decide hard cases. Refined comparativism is not an idea that gives judges a new
power to strike down laws. Rather, it is just a discussion of the sources that judges can use in exercising their traditional power of constitutional review.
The second judicial discretion-type objection would center on not the general role of judges
in refined comparativism but rather on the role of judges using comparative materials in particular. This objection is discussed infra Part VII.B.2.
82.
528 U.S. 990 (1999).
83.
Id. at 998 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also Thirty Hogsheads of
Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (“The decisions of the Courts of every country . . . will be received, not as authority, but with respect.”).
84.
Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975). To use Frank
Michelman’s language, constitutional interpretation involves “multiple poles in a complex field
of forces, among which judges navigate and negotiate.” Frank I. Michelman, A Constitutional
Conversation with Professor Frank Michelman, 11 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 477, 483 (1995). My goal is
simply to argue that comparative constitutional law, in those cases involving complex forces, be
one pole in that field.
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not argued should be superceded by comparative constitutional law—will
resolve the issue presented to a court, the case is not a “hard case,” and
therefore the court does not need to look to comparative constitutional law.
When the American sources are clear and unambiguous, and help lead to a
clearly correct answer, a court need not consult comparative constitutional
law.85 However, when a case presents many difficult questions and there
is no clear answer, either because of the originality of the issue presented86
or because of the conflicting directions in which the sources point,
comparative constitutional law may provide additional sources of law to help
a court reach an answer. Comparative constitutional law merely serves as
another source outside of traditional sources of American law that helps
resolve a case. Whether courts cite to classics of literature or to legal scholarship, they have frequently looked beyond the traditional domestic legal
sources for answers, as they would do in refined comparativism.87 Judges
would look at the case before them, and see if they can resolve it using the
basic, obvious American sources. If not, then a judge can begin to consider
using comparative constitutional law. This may be because the issue
presented is new and evolving,88 the constitutional provision being litigated
is relatively ambiguous,89 or so on. Using comparative constitutional law,
85.
A court can still consult and use comparative constitutional law in the easiest of cases
by using it in dicta in order to provide context, to suggest the adoption of a different principle, or
to point out a constitutional fact. Another interpretation of Guido Calabresi’s opinion in Then
is that the American sources are in fact clear, but Calabresi wants us to consider adopting the
judicial power to issue suspensive vetoes, and thus mentions the Italian and German cases.
United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
86.
Thus, included within the definition of “hard cases” are those cases in which a new
issue is presented to a court, and even though the sources may point in one direction, there has
been no practical experience with how a decision one way or another would work. Usually, however, refined comparativism would make sense when the issue is new, the sources are conflicting,
and another country has greater experience with this particular issue.
87.
American literature is not somehow more binding on a court than comparative constitutional law. True, American literature is a part of American culture, and therefore it expresses
elements of the domestic culture that the Constitution is trying to give life to, but it is much less
relevant to deciding legal cases than comparative constitutional law. Even if it is more relevant,
however, that is simply authorization for the notion of “intertextualism,” and comparative constitutional law would be simply lower down the list of relevant intertextual sources than literature.
It is not necessary to argue that courts should employ refined comparativism to assert that
comparative constitutional law is somehow the most binding source of constitutional meaning.
88.
This seems to be the thrust of Justice David Souter’s use of Dutch constitutional
practice in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). In that case, Justice Souter looked
to Dutch practice because “[t]he day may come” when the United States gains substantial experience with the issue, but currently other countries have more experience. Id. at 786 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
89.
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 11–41 (1980) (mentioning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the unenumerated rights language of the Ninth Amendment, and the various clauses of Section 1 of the
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even in “hard cases,” should be considered optional—comparative
constitutional cases are not binding precedents that a judge must consider.90
To minimize the possible difficulties of considering comparative constitutional law, a court using its insights should consider contextual differences
between the lender country and the United States.91 The court should view
these contextual differences on a sliding scale: The more contextual
differences, the less desirable utilizing comparative constitutional law will
be. For example, Justice Breyer’s use of comparative constitutional law in
Knight illustrates how a judge might make sure to use comparative
constitutional law in situations in which the problems of constitutional
ideas traveling across borders are minimized. Justice Breyer noted that the
courts he was looking to had faced “roughly comparable”92 questions under
Fourteenth Amendment as examples of open-ended constitutional language). If the constitutional provision being litigated is ambiguous, and the provision itself has been and should be
interpreted in a functionalist way, then comparative constitutional law may be even more
relevant. An American judge can look to comparative constitutional law in that instance (for
example, in the case of federalism, as in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 976–78 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)) to come up with a rule or standard that, based on the
experience of the other country, leads the judge to believe that the comparative principle will further the goals or ends that the American constitutional system contemplates.
90.
Once these comparative constitutional cases are used in an American judicial opinion,
the judge would have the power to determine whether or not these cases themselves (and their
predecessors and progeny) are binding precedent. The “minimalist” refined comparativist can
simply make the American case that used comparative constitutional law the binding precedent,
while the “maximalist” refined comparativist can make some or all of the comparative constitutional cases binding precedents. For a discussion of the judicial power over precedent, see, for
example, Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), which held that all judicial
decisions must have precedential effect because of Article III’s “judicial power” language. For critiques of this position, see Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 219 (1999); Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & The Nature
of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 17 (2000); Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite
This: Why We Don’t Allow Citation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43;
Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (1999); Philip
Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge’s View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909 (1986);
Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989); Evan P. Schultz, Gone
Hunting: Judge Richard Arnold of the 8th Circuit Has Taken Aim at Unpublished Opinions, but Missed
His Mark, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000; George M. Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished
Judicial Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477 (1988); and Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Article III
Powers—Eighth Circuit Holds that Unpublished Opinions Must Be Accorded Precedential Effect.—
Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), 114 HARV. L. REV. 940 (2001). For a
general discussion of the role of precedent, see, for example, Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and
Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1037 (1990); and Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV.
571 (1987).
91.
In other words, courts should consider whether or not they would be using genealogical
comparativism or ahistorical comparativism, with genealogical comparativism being preferred to
ahistorical comparativism.
92.
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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“roughly comparable . . . standards,”93 and he placed particular emphasis on
the judicial opinions of countries that are “former Commonwealth
nations”94 because “those opinions reflect a legal tradition that also under95
lies our own Eighth Amendment.” In other words, the more similar to the
United States the legal issue, legal system, legal history, and social situation
that the other country faces, the more desirable the use of refined comparativism becomes.
A court should also consider how the comparative constitutional
information matters in the domestic context. If a court is crafting broad,
abstract legal rules that will basically be litigated and given real content by
future American litigation (as opposed to issuing a decision that is much
more like legislation), concerns about particularism should be less for two
reasons. First of all, a court in that situation is writing for an audience
composed of the legal elite. The legal elite is much more concerned than
is the regular public with legitimation and therefore with finding that a
judicial decision has precedent, whatever shape that precedent may take.96
Also, a broad rule that does not have to address the basics of practical
implementation (as compared to, for instance, a case finding an Eighth
Amendment violation in a particular prison) is less likely to have problems
leading to positive outcomes in the American context. Therefore, for these
two reasons, the more the court is legislating, and the less it is simply
announcing broad appellate rules that will be given actual content by subsequent cases that translate the comparativist insight into the American
scene, the more reluctant the court should be to use comparative constitutional law.
A court worried about the practical difficulties of transporting a legal
rule or fact into the United States has several options at its disposal to help
minimize the problems of particularism. It can, most obviously, simply
decline to use comparative constitutional law, even though the case before
it is a “hard case” and it feels that using comparative constitutional law
could potentially be helpful. A court can also decide to import the comparative constitutional insight, but only in a limited fashion. It can borrow only
one particular case from the constitutional law of another country, but
decide not to import all relevant precedents from that country, so the seed
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
This audience of a judicial decision will not be as affected by the problems of particularism as an audience of the entire public, because, as stated earlier, the legal elite will search for
legitimation through precedent and tradition, in this case the precedent and tradition of comparative constitutional law.
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from the other country can grow once planted in American ground. A
court can also use comparativist insights but make this use tentative—it can
apply it to this one case only, thereby not giving its decision any precedential value, or it can apply the comparativist insight with full precedential
force, but only after the court has waited a certain period of time to make
sure that the constitutional borrowing has been effective.
After deciding that the American sources do not provide a clear answer
to an issue the judge faces, and that contextual considerations do not prevent
the use of comparative constitutional law, the refined comparativist judge
must next consider whether the potential comparative constitutional
sources would add anything additional to the case. Another country could
have a comparative legal advantage or a comparative sociolegal advantage. In
the first instance (comparative legal advantage), another country has
simply litigated and answered the question before the American court
before any American court (or the particular American court hearing the
case) has had an opportunity to do so. Not only does the foreign court have
a series of legal principles on the issue, but it may also have documented
evidence of how those legal principles work in practice. The country, in
short, has faced the legal issue and all that comes with it before the United
States has. In Washington v. Glucksberg,97 for instance, the Supreme Court
could have noted that even before any American court had ruled upon the
constitutionality of the laws at issue, courts in Canada98 and in India99 had
ruled on the constitutionality of restrictions on assisted suicide—they have
a comparative legal advantage. In the second instance (comparative
sociolegal advantage), another country has faced the type of extralegal
considerations before the United States has been forced to do so. For
example, the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision about hate speech in
Regina v. Keegstra100 dealt with the role of multiculturalism in constitutional
law. Demographic change in the United States has created an increas101
ingly multicultural republic, and Canada had dealt with this extralegal

97.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
98.
Rodriguez v. British Columbia [1993] D.L.R. 342 (Can.) (interpreting the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms not to include a mandatory right to assisted suicide). Chief
Justice Rehnquist cited Rodriguez in Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 718 n.16, but merely as dicta context.
The reasoning of Rodriguez played no role in the argument of the Rehnquist opinion.
99.
Gian Haur (Smt) v. State of Punjab [1996] 2 L.R.C. 264 (India). The Indian case
upheld the criminalization of assisted suicide, after reviewing American, British, and Canadian
decisions. Id.
100.
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.). For a further discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 347–381.
101.
See, e.g., VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 9 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994).
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consideration and its ramifications for constitutional law before the United
States had.102
These situations of comparative advantages would be the paradigmatic
instances of when a court should consider comparative constitutional law.
In those instances, an American court facing a relatively new issue seeks
to answer the issue in a way that law finds most desirable: through the lens
of experience, in this case comparative constitutional experience. Even
without any finding of comparative advantage, however, a court may use
comparative constitutional law simply for the originality of the idea of
another country103 or because comparative constitutional law provides
another data point,104 although these uses of comparative constitutional law
are not as defensible as the paradigmatic instances of constitutional
borrowing discussed earlier.
B.

How a Court Should Use Comparative Constitutional Law:
The Process of Trial and Appeal

How, you might ask, can American judges, most likely trained only in
American law and speaking only English, use comparative constitutional
law in their judicial opinions? Unfortunately, the little literature on the
topic and the past examples of judicial borrowings of comparative constitutional law do not address this issue of improving judicial capacity to use
comparative constitutional law. Judges have simply used comparative constitutional law without any consideration of a legal process that might
enable them to use comparative constitutional law most effectively.
First of all, structuring a process of refined comparativism would
involve the creation of a transnational constitutional law digest, restatements
of comparative constitutional law, and more comparative constitutional law
casebooks105 that would help lead to greater comparative law education in
102.
To see if there is any comparative advantage to be gained from using comparative constitutional law, I am proposing that courts actually look into comparative constitutional law, thus
creating a situation in which they look at comparative constitutional law before deciding whether
or not to use it.
103.
This would be a form of ahistorical comparativism—whether or not the lending country has any relationship to American constitutional law, it has an interesting idea. This invokes
notions of law as science—if, for example, a scientist in another country made an interesting discovery, we would care very little about the relationship between that scientist’s country and our
country for the purposes of assessing the validity of the discovery.
104.
E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating
that comparative constitutional law “may . . . cast an empirical light” on American constitutional
practice).
105.
The recent publication of a comparative constitutional law casebook represents an
important step in the right direction. JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 10. The textbook, how-
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American law schools.106 In this way, the type of professionalization of law
that occurred in other areas of American law in the early and middle part of
the last century107 could be employed to make comparative constitutional
borrowings most effective.108 Most importantly, however, the use of
comparative constitutional law by judges in their opinions would encourage
litigants to make comparative constitutional law part of their briefs and part
of their efforts at trial.109 The litigants can make use of rules already in
place; for instance, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44, which states that
“[a] party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign
country should give reasonable notice in his pleadings or other reasonable
written notice [to other parties and to the court].”110 In this way, litigants
would help the court most effectively use comparative constitutional law by
making it part of the regular litigation process. The parties can use a
comparative constitutional law expert to help litigants and the court
understand the comparative constitutional issues.111 This expert may have
to give a deposition, be subjected to cross-examination, or actually testify at
a summary judgment motion hearing or trial.
The court itself has the power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
44, “in determining foreign law,”112 to “consider any relevant material or
source.”113 In constitutional cases, since Brown v. Board of Education114 and
ever, does not address non-Western constitutional law, which the authors themselves acknowledge. Id. at ix (recognizing that the book would benefit from discussion of “constitutionalism and
Islamic cultures, and . . . constitutional developments in Latin America, Asia and Africa”).
106.
For an instructive summary of the history of comparative legal education in American
law schools, see Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, supra note 15, at 592 nn. 43–44.
107.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: WHAT IT IS
AND WHAT IT DOES (1994).
108.
For example, there could be continuing legal education courses for judges, a section of
the American Law Institute devoted to compiling information on comparative constitutional law,
and so on.
109.
Cf. Abrahmson & Fischer, supra note 52, at 275 (noting a brief before the Wisconsin
Supreme Court that stated the lawyers were unaware if they should cite to foreign law because it is
unclear whether foreign law has “precedential value in the United States”).
110.
FED. R. CIV. P. 44; Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All Am. Marine Slip, 20 F.3d 1224, 1239
(3d Cir. 1994); Pfizer Inc. v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 812 F. Supp. 1352, 1360–61 (D. Del.
1993); 3 MARGARET A. BERGER ET AL., EVIDENCE § 702 (1996); 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2444, at 643–48 (2d ed. 1995).
111.
If a court does not want to appoint its own expert, and it believes it is being force-fed
“junk” foreign law, it can use the principles handed down by the Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the Court rejected the old “general acceptance” test and held that evidence can be admissible under a new standard that, among
other requirements, mandates that evidence must be “relevant . . . [and] reliable.” Id. at 589.
112.
FED. R. CIV. P. 44; see also John Merryman, Foreign Law as a Problem, 19 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 151, 154–55, 172–73 (1983).
113.
FED. R. CIV. P. 44.
114.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the negative reaction115 to footnote eleven’s use of social science116 (even
though the footnote played such a small role in the Court’s decision117),
courts have been unwilling to use resources at their disposal to increase
118
their fact-finding powers. In the case of foreign law, however, frequently
the lawyers “will do an inadequate job of researching and presenting foreign
law or will attempt to prove it in such a partisan fashion that the court is
obliged to go beyond their offerings.”119 To help them make their own decisions, courts that consider using comparative constitutional law (or have
already decided to use it) can rely on some of the other federal rules.
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 permits a court on its own motion to appoint
an expert witness.120 An expert witness can conduct his or her own research
and then advise the parties of his or her findings. Any party may take a
deposition of the expert and the expert may be called to testify by the court
or by a party. A court can also use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 to
appoint a special master, who would help the court with a foreign law
issue.121 The special master makes a final report to the judge.122 If the court
is concerned about contextual differences and how a comparative rule
would work in the American context, the court may appoint someone
trained to study differing institutional contexts who may look at sources
beyond written constitutional, statutory, and decisional law to determine
how the law has actually worked in another country.123
115.
Ernest van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases—A Reply
to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REV. 69 (1960). See generally MICHAEL J. SAKS & CHARLES
H. BARON, THE USE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS (1980)
(providing an overview of the way social science research has been used by the courts and the
ways in which this use has been criticized); Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional
Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75 (examining the role of “facts” in the creation of constitutional
law). Some scholars have defended Brown’s use of social science. E.g., PAUL L. ROSEN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 134–72 (1972) (defending Brown’s use of social science
as a continuation of the sociological jurisprudence of Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and
Roscoe Pound).
116.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
117.
See Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157–67 (1955).
118.
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 119–20 & n.2 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(criticizing Brown and other cases for their use of social science).
119.
Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 758 F.2d 1185, 1193 (7th Cir. 1985).
120.
FED. R. EVID. 706.
121.
FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
122.
A number of reported cases mention the use of a court-appointed special master to
resolve foreign law issues. E.g., Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 430 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Corporacion
Salvadorena de Calzado, S.A. v. Injection Footwear Corp., 533 F. Supp. 290 (S.D. Fla. 1982). But
see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 787 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (questioning
“whether an independent front-line investigation into the facts of a foreign country’s legal
administration can be soundly undertaken through American courtroom litigation”).
123.
The court can rely on a list of experts on constitutional law in different countries maintained by organizations such as the American Foreign Law Association and the American
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At the Supreme Court level, it is unclear whether the Court itself can
use all of these powers,124 but it certainly can rely on the lower trial and
appellate courts that have made use of these powers. Although the
Supreme Court could reach out and use comparative constitutional law
even when not briefed,125 it should encourage counsel to brief comparative
constitutional law arguments just as it should encourage lower courts to
make use of their powers to look at comparative constitutional law.126 This
way, the Court is overcoming its relative institutional isolation and trying
to do the best it can with comparative constitutional law. Indeed, even if
counsel does not address comparative constitutional law, the Court itself
may ask counsel to brief the comparative issues just as it would ask them to
brief specific legal issues.127 Still, the unique limitations the Court itself
faces may encourage the Court to allow for greater comparative experimentalism in the lower courts because of their greater ability to deal with comparative constitutional issues.

Academy of Foreign Law. A court can use an expert in the stage when it decides whether or not
to use comparative constitutional law at all, even before deciding how it actually may use comparative constitutional law.
124.
The current practice of the Court allows for special masters for cases within the Court’s
original jurisdiction, as in New Jersey v. New York, 513 U.S. 924 (1994), but does not do so for
cases it hears on appeal, even when the lower court has not addressed the question the Court
would consider consulting a special master to help them resolve. The powers of the Court to
appoint a special master in cases that fall outside of its original jurisdiction are not entirely clear.
In cases in which the Court exercises its original jurisdiction, “the scope of the Masters’ authority
is not always clear [because] the Court’s rules make no provision respecting the proceedings before
a Master.” ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 487 (7th ed. 1983). SUP. CT.
R. 17.2 does allow for the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal
Rules of Evidence in cases in which the Court exercises its original jurisdiction. Id. at 488 n.38.
It is not entirely clear if this means that in cases where the Court exercises appellate jurisdiction
those rules do not apply—and whether or not because those rules do provide for the appointment
of special masters, stating those rules do not apply necessarily means that the Court is without
authority to appoint a special master according to regulations it may make outside of the federal
rules.
125.
This has been the usual practice—the cases over its history in which the Court cites
comparative constitutional law only rarely involve a mention of comparative constitutional law
in any of the briefs, oral arguments, or lower court opinions that the Court reviews. As Martin S.
Flaherty pointed out to me, however, the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights was going to initiate a project whereby it would file amicus briefs that made frequent reference to comparative
constitutional law, but this project never materialized.
126.
This decentralized approach to comparative constitutional law has obvious advantages
because of the institutional limitations facing the Court. Lower trial courts, and even lower
appellate courts, have a greater ability to inquire into the idiosyncrasies of comparative constitutional law and therefore can make a better determination of the appropriateness of borrowing
and how comparative constitutional law might best be used.
127.
E.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Tel., Inc., 521 U.S. 1151 (1997); Bogan v. ScottHarris, 520 U.S. 1263 (1997).
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF REFINED COMPARATIVISM

½

When to use refined
comparativism

½
½
½

½

Resources for a
refined comparativist judge

½
½
½

Hard case
No contextual problems (relevant factors include comparative similarities, domestic audience)
Comparative legal advantage/comparative sociolegal
advantage or data points
Litigants argue comparative constitutional law
Litigants use expert witness
Judge uses expert or special master

III. THE VIRTUES OF REFINED COMPARATIVISM
The refined comparativist vision I sketched out earlier has many
advantages for American constitutional law and for American constitutional scholarship. First of all, it has several practical advantages that will
lead to “better law.” Simply put, it will force courts to look at a broader
range of ideas and possibilities, and will lead to a richer judicial dialogue.
Courts will have a wider range of relevant precedent and legal options
to look at, and will be able to choose constitutional principles and constitutional facts that will help them decide cases before them. At a normative
level, refined comparativism can have a positive impact in broadening the
cultural horizon of constitutional law—it can help constitutional law come to
grips with the evolution of a multicultural society. This can be accomplished
through recognition of the relevance of foreign cultures to our constitutional law, and by allowing for greater value clarification.
A. Pragmatic Virtues of Refined Comparativism
The first set of advantages of refined comparativism fall under the rubric
of “better solution” comparative law:128 Using the insights of comparative
constitutional law will lead to better solutions to questions posed by

128.
1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 15
(Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987) (stating that “[comparative law] offers . . . the opportunity of finding the ‘better solution’ for . . . [t]his time and place”); Abrahmson & Fischer, supra note 52, at 287
(“In fact, foreign opinions could function like superstar amicus briefs, offering otherwise
unavailable viewpoints, delivered from unique perspectives, by some of the world’s leading legal
minds.”); Wolfgang Däubler, Comparison of Labor Law in Socialist and Capitalist Systems, 4 COMP.
LAB. L.J. 79, 85–86 (1981) (noting the innovative new solutions to labor problems in Socialist
countries); Friedrich K. Juenger, American Jurisdiction: A Story of Comparative Neglect, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) (arguing that comparative law “provides a storehouse of solutions”).
See generally EDWARD JENKS, THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE (1933) (advocating the comparative
method as a helpful way of finding new legal ideas).
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American constitutional law.129 Consider two situations under refined
comparativism when a court should contemplate using comparative constitutional law. The first situation is when another country (or group of countries) has evolutionary/comparative advantages—this country or these
countries have already dealt with the issues that the American court now
faces. Remember that these legal policy evolutionary advantages can be
either legal (experience dealing with the creation of a particular legal rule
or experience with how a particular legal rule works) or sociolegal (they
have had greater experience dealing with the extralegal elements). In these
instances, American courts facing an issue that they have relatively little
experience with would have their own “laboratories”130 from which to glean
insights about the proper course of action. American courts would be tak131
ing advantage of the “rise of world constitutionalism” and would benefit
from the different rules regarding standing in other countries that may allow
them to decide issues in courts faster than American courts do.132 American
courts would reap all of the benefits of legal and practical experience without having to compromise their traditional rules of standing, ripeness, and
the like. The American court using comparative constitutional law can use
Vincent Blasi’s idea of the pathological perspective133 to avoid the harmful
results of rules that resulted in other countries, or can adjust the rules from
other countries based on what worked best there without having to endure
the difficulties of the trial run that the foreign country did.
The second situation in which refined comparativism would be particularly appropriate is when the lending country (or group of countries) being
examined has no evolutionary advantages—its legal and social development
has not addressed an issue earlier than the United States has—but that
country provides a helpful set of data points. In crafting a workable judicial
principle, for example, another country simply has an interesting idea that a
129.
The little literature on the economics of comparative law has noted that it is economically efficient to borrow. E.g., Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative
Law and Economics, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994).
130.
Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that states “may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments”). For arguments in favor of the “laboratory” model of federalism, see DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85–88 (1995); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1499 (1994); and Michael McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498–500 (1987). For criticisms of the laboratory
model, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980). For a rejoinder to Susan Rose-Ackerman’s arguments, see Barry
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 397–400 (1997).
131.
Ackerman, supra note 3, at 772.
132.
See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1981); STONE, supra note 9.
133.
Supra note 59.
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court could borrow,134 just as a court may borrow an interesting idea from
legal scholarship. Or, as Justice Breyer used comparative constitutional law
in Printz v. United States,135 these comparative inquiries may help cast an
“empirical light”136 on how the law works. Considering institutional
limitations facing the judiciary, these extra data points may be especially
helpful. For one thing, globalization plus advanced social science means
that the data from law in action abroad might make comparative
constitutional law a helpful source of constitutional fact. In crafting rules of
law or workable principles, the more possibilities a judge can consider, the
more likely he or she is to craft a principle that does justice to the
American sources. In this way, comparative constitutional law is a means
of overcoming domestic constitutional uncertainty. The diversity of the
American constitutional experience may call out for a principle that cannot
be found anywhere in the American sources, but that can be created from
comparative sources.
In a system of refined comparativism, if a court uses comparative constitutional law due either to comparative evolutionary advantages or simply
to locate more data points, there would be a number of benefits that would
follow. First, refined comparativism would force courts to open their eyes to
the true assumptions behind American constitutional law,137 and would dispel any sense of false necessity.138 As Clifford Geertz has written, sometimes
it is helpful to look to other cultures simply to help us understand that elements of our own culture, which seem so natural and obvious as to be unself-conscious, are indeed not natural or inevitable components of human
existence.139 Looking to other countries may make a court understand the
unstated assumptions and arguments behind its opinion, thereby increasing
134.
See, e.g., United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“American courts might . . . take note of what the Constitutional Courts of some
cognate countries have done in like situations.”).
135.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
136.
Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137.
See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 8–9 (1987);
Ewald, supra note 4; Frankenberg, supra note 4; cf. Mitchel de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, Comparative Law
and Comparative Literature: A Project in Progress, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 471, 474–77.
138.
The term “constitution” gives one a sense that the present system of arrangements was
somehow inevitable—the exposure to other legal systems will teach one otherwise.
139.
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 57 (1983). Through this process we would
not only learn the value of other constitutional systems, but we would also learn the value (and
problems) of our own constitutional system. See J.B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 257
(1990). Alasdair MacIntyre notes that individuals encountering an “alien” tradition may discover
that it provides a perspective from which “the limitations, incoherences, and poverty of resources
of their own beliefs can be identified, characterized, and explained in a way not possible from
within their own tradition.” ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?
387–88 (1988).
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judicial candor,140 and may encourage a frank discussion of all relevant legal
arguments:
Instead of pretending to the posture of a neutral, objective, and disinterested observer, the comparatist has to regard herself as being
involved: involved in an ongoing, particular social practice
constituted and pervaded by law; involved in a given legal tradition
(a peculiar story of law); and involved in a specific mode of thinking
141
and talking about law.

Also, under positive comparativism the court using comparative constitutional law is simply able to make itself a more widely read constitutional court, one that is aware of a broader range of possible effective
solutions. Negative comparativism may provide a useful sort of constitutional reasoning to help a court examine the bare minimum number
of items it can take to be true. Consider this a variation of Jed Rubenfeld’s
idea of locating paradigm cases142 or Cass Sunstein’s notion of reasoning by
analogy from paradigm cases.143 A court can see what it clearly believes our
constitutional law is not by locating the paradigmatic example of what it
considers our constitutional regime to reject, and thus help it understand
what our Constitution is by reasoning by analogy from those negative paradigm cases.144 At base, better solution comparative law virtues of refined
comparativism help us realize that law, in looking for better solutions, prefers those that have been tested and tried; law values experience over
speculation.145
140.
This is of course a desirable outcome only if judicial candor is a good thing. Only some
scholarship directly focuses on judicial candor—see, for example, GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 172–77 (1982); Scott Altman, A Prudential Theory
of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV 1307 (1995); Susan Estrich, The Justice of Candor, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1227 (1996); and David Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731
(1987).
141.
Frankenberg, supra note 4, at 443.
142.
E.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 804 (1989).
143.
E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993); cf.
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1–2 (1949); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 201–06 (1979). To use another of Cass Sunstein’s ideas, using negative
paradigmatic comparativism might be one way of deciding hard cases through “judicial minimalism.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996). Those attracted to the idea of judicial minimalism should be similarly attracted to the idea of negative paradigmatic comparativism—deciding a
case simply by deciding what the U.S. Constitution is not.
144.
I have listed many examples of negative comparativism throughout this Article; see, for
example, supra note 59.
145.
The law would seem to prefer a decision that rests on an established system of law
rather than on an innovative judicial decision, because an established system of law “expresses the
experience of many . . . [rather than] employ[ing] a personal yardstick of [its] own.” EUGEN
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This vision of refined comparativism also fits with other important
trends in contemporary American constitutional jurisprudence. First, the
trend towards balancing and cost-benefit analysis in constitutional adjudication calls for a fuller accounting of all relevant information in a constitutional case. Here, the type of comparative constitutional law analysis
used to find certain constitutional facts becomes helpful. The past experience of other countries can help an American court determine if the legislative means used in a piece of legislation before the court really helps
achieve the desired end.146 The past experience of other countries can help
a court determine how successful a certain program will be. In the case of
judicial balancing, as will be discussed in Part VII, other countries may have
some experience with the benefits of certain programs and will have been
able to see the relative impact a governmental activity has on both sides
whose interests are being balanced. The ambiguity in constitutional adjudication introduced by the move from formalism to cost-benefit functionalism
would be partially remedied by the fuller accounting of costs and benefits
that results from using comparative data.
Refined comparativism can be one way of adjusting to certain sociolegal
changes that should alter our understanding of the proper role of the judge
in constitutional cases. Constitutional scholarship focusing on the judiciary
and on constitutional interpretation has failed to sufficiently analyze
important extralegal changes such as multiculturalism and technological
advancement. Now that social change occurs rapidly through technological progression and the like, constitutional gradualism will be an increasingly ineffective means of constitutional evolution. Gradual constitutional
change does not allow judges to benefit from the lessons of experience. In
the American constitutional system, federal judges have an even harder
time learning from experience because of the isolation created by Article
III.147 The primary confidants and peers of contemporary federal judges, law
clerks, have very little experience and are drawn from the same law school

LANGEN, TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 216 (Bernard Noble trans., 1973) (citing
GERHARD KAGEL, LEO RAAPE UND DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT DER GEGENWART, 18
RABELSZ 7 (1966)). This argument seems particularly compelling in the contemporary sociolegal
context of constitutional law. Societal diversity will make it hard for a judge to have a true understanding of the consequences of his or her decisions. In addition, the courts of foreign countries
have developed more mature systems of adjudication than in the past, and so their solutions
deserve greater respect than they did in the past.
146.
E.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 786 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(looking to Dutch constitutional practice to judge the means-end fit of American state laws).
147.
This is of course not a new argument. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court,
1959 Term—Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes—Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV.
81, 81 (1960) (“[T]he Supreme Court is inevitably an isolated and remote body.”).
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culture of constitutional gradualism as judges.148 In the contemporary age,
when change occurs so rapidly, and in such a diverse country, we should
worry about these problems the judiciary faces in attempting to learn from
experience and should encourage the judiciary to focus more on workable
solutions drawn from the lessons of experience149 and less about the
meaning of authoritative texts.150
One way of encouraging judges to learn from experience and to look
for practical solutions is to encourage a kind of legal experimentalism. This
means deference to and greater study of American policymaking institutions, but also means that judges may learn about the real-world consequences of judicial action from the experience of other countries.151 This
type of “transjudicial communication”152 with other constitutional adjudicative bodies around the world may also help spread American jurisprudence.153 Other constitutional court judges have sometimes noted with
anger the relative unwillingness of American constitutional law to learn from
experience abroad,154 and as a kind of crude reciprocal revenge have refused
to consider American constitutional law. If American constitutionalists are
convinced that they have the right answer, one way to spread this
148.
As long as law students apply for clerkships in the fall of the second year, after completing the common law courses of the first year of legal education, this will inevitably be the case:
The better the student performs in their first year common law courses, the stronger a candidate
they are for a clerkship, and stronger candidates usually receive federal clerkships.
149.
See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998) (arguing for “provisional adjudication” as a way of overcoming institutional limitations facing courts and enabling courts to participate in the effective
implementation of a constitutional regime); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996
Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997) (arguing that part of
the mission of the Supreme Court is to not only find the meaning of the Constitution but also to
implement the Constitution successfully).
150.
Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
133, 146–52 (1997) (criticizing Ronald Dworkin’s argument that hard cases have correct answers
because of the limitations of the judiciary in finding such correct answers even if they did exist).
151.
This is partly the reason for Judge Posner’s argument that the Court should make
greater use of social science research. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND
LEGAL THEORY (1999); Posner, supra note 60, at 11–12.
152.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 99 (1994).
153.
E.g., Clare L’Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 20 (1998) (noting that the “worldwide
influence of the U.S. Supreme Court” has been greater in previous years because previous
Supreme Courts have been more willing to cite to and use comparative constitutional law). Many
in the constitutional law establishment have changed their mind about the desirability of spreading American constitutional ideas to other countries around the world. See Howard & Fontana,
supra note 18, at 17–27.
154.
L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 153, at 21 (arguing that it is “disrespectful” to other courts
around the world for American courts to entirely ignore them).
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constitutional gospel is through a respectful analysis of the decisions of
other constitutional courts around the world.
B.

Normative Virtues of Refined Comparativism

Refined comparativism will also have several normative benefits for
American constitutional law. To the extent that American constitutional
scholarship has used comparative constitutional law, it has typically used
the type of thin genealogical comparativism present in cases like Loving v.
United States155—looking to English history because that is one of the
sources of or predecessors to American law. Refined comparativism would
encourage American constitutional law to develop a richer sense of genealogical comparativism, recognizing the full panoply of American diversity
that leads to a broader constitutional identity than contemporary American
constitutional law recognizes. The vision of comparative constitutional law
that only uses the thin genealogical comparativism behind Loving misses
relevant sources of American constitutional identity. What would this
thick genealogical comparativism include?
First of all, this thick genealogical comparativism would recognize that
part of who we are—what constitutes us—is of course where our present legal
system came from. This is the thin genealogical version that looks at
English history as well as Greek, Roman, and other legal systems that the
Founders borrowed from in creating the Constitution. There are also
genealogical linkages with those countries that share a common heritage, cultural and legal, with the United States. Justice Breyer’s opinion in Knight v.
Florida156 uses this version of genealogical comparativism, looking to “former
Commonwealth nations”157 because their “opinions reflect a legal tradition
that also underlies our own [constitutional system].”158 This “common heritage” version of thick genealogical comparativism has been used in
American constitutional law that has looked at state constitutional practice
as a relevant source in making American federal constitutional law—states
come from the same basic legal tradition as does the federal government, and
therefore their constitutional ideas are relevant sources of constitutional
law.
Recently, we can add to this “common heritage” branch of thick genealogical comparativism an offspring version of genealogical comparativism.
While countries have long borrowed from American constitutional law and
155.
156.
157.
158.
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sought the advice of American constitutionalists,159 it is not until the last
fifty years or so that countries have relatively successfully borrowed from
American constitutional law. As Judge Calabresi notes in United States v.
Then:160
At one time, America had a virtual monopoly on constitutional judicial review . . . . [Drawing] origin and inspiration from American
constitutional theory and practice . . . [t]hese [newer democracies] are
our “constitutional offspring” and how they have dealt with problems
analogous to ours can be very useful to us when we face difficult
constitutional issues. Wise parents do not hesitate to learn from
161
their children.

We can add to the common heritage and offspring versions of thick
genealogical comparativism a notion of constitutive constitutional identity that
should be part of a thick genealogical comparativism. This constitutive
version of constitutional identity supporting a thick genealogical comparativism essentially states that “the United States is very similar to the world.”
First, this constitutive constitutional identity can be one way of taking
account of the impact multiculturalism should have on American constitutional law. Now that Americans come from all over the place, and have
become part of the American constitutional polity, we must take account of
them and their traditions and habits, because the traditions and habits of
American citizens are relevant in constructing American constitutional
law. Now that Americans come from countries all over the world, to fully
understand who they are and their relevance to our constitutional praxis,
we must study the constitutional law of their countries. The second element of this globalized version of constitutive constitutional identity notes
that we are all global citizens now, sharing at some level the same basic mission and goals to protect certain fundamental rights and beliefs. Although
many Americans from other countries come to our constitutional republic
to flee their own legal tradition, there will be sublegal and cultural elements
of their former country’s legal and social systems that must be incorporated
into our own constitutional system. This makes it all the more important
that refined comparativism does not result in a Eurocentric refined comparativism162—although a comparativist judge may naturally look to Germany
and France, it is all the more important now that the judge look to the
countries from which the most recent wave of American citizens come from
originally.
159.
160.
161.
162.
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Refined comparativism can also help with domestic value clarification.
This becomes especially true when one considers the notion of negative
comparativism that I earlier introduced. It may be helpful to locate the
American “public philosophy”163 or “overlapping consensus”164 in a multicultural age if we can reason from certain paradigmatic instances of what
we are not. Take, for example, the case of Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei.165 In that case, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of the
continued exclusion of an alien from the United States without a hearing,
although the alien had no country to return to while he was excluded. The
dissent noted the difficulty in finding a shared national value system or practice,166 so instead used the system of negative paradigmatic comparativism—
reasoning by looking at the paradigmatic instance of what our constitutional
system is not. Justice Robert Jackson’s dissent objected to executive detention of aliens without a hearing as bearing “unmistakable overtones of the
‘protective custody’ of the Nazis.”167 Justice Black’s dissent analogized the
detention practices to Soviet and Nazi practices.168

IV. A HISTORY OF REFINED COMPARATIVISM
Does this method of using comparative constitutional law in American
judicial decisions have historical support? Perhaps surprisingly, there is a long
history of American judges using comparative constitutional law in their
judicial opinions. The Court has not always used comparative constitutional
law when it could have, but rather has a long history of making occasional
references to it (this Article argues that although there are past examples of
the Court using comparative constitutional law, the Court should use it
more often). Thus, Part IV serves to show not that the Court has quite
often looked to comparative constitutional law, but rather that there is some
163.
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY (1996).
164.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their
Priority, in 3 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1982);
John Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 159 (1977); John Rawls, The Idea of an
Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political
Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985); John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral
Theory: The Dewey Lectures: Rational and Full Autonomy, 77 J. PHIL. 515 (1980); John Rawls, The
Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251 (1988).
165.
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
166.
Id. at 218 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (finding it hard to locate an agreed upon moral consensus on the issue before the Court “in this country”).
167.
Id. at 226.
168.
Id. at 217–18 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 224 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (using
negative paradigmatic comparativism by referring to Soviet practices).

49:2

Fontana

Fontana Handcrafted.doc

(11/19/01 8:34 PM)

Refined Comparativism

575

precedent for refined comparativism. However, considering that liberal
democratic constitutional regimes were not common until fairly recently,169
this comparativist judicial impulse is all the more surprising. A study of the
use of comparative constitutional law shows that the Court, and indeed the
Founders before it, used many of the techniques of refined comparativism—
finding American sources to be unclear and then using comparative sources
that come from similar contexts to help reach a decision.
The Founding itself provides support for refined comparativism.
Justice Scalia argued in Printz v. United States170 that the Founders’ “interpretive intention” was for comparative materials to be used only in the
drafting of the Constitution but not in its interpretation.171 In fact, several
of the leading documents from the Founding and the general intellectual
context of the Founding seem to suggest otherwise. The comparativist
impulses of the Founding have carried over into subsequent case law at the
Supreme Court level.
A. Founding
As Justice Scalia argued in Printz, “comparative analy172
sis . . . was . . . relevant to the task of writing” the U.S. Constitution. But
was the Founders’ original “interpretive intention”173 that comparative
materials would only be used in drafting the Constitution and not in its
interpretation, as Justice Scalia also claimed in Printz? In fact, the evidence
from the Founding demonstrates quite the opposite. The Founders wanted
comparativism to be as much a part of constitutional interpretation as
it was of constitutional creation. Comparative insights had undeniable
169.
E.g., CAPPELLETTI & COHEN, supra note 10, at 13–16 (arguing that comparative constitutional law only became viable after World War II).
170.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
171.
Id. at 921 n.11 (“Comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one.”).
172.
Id.
173.
My goal here is not to extensively involve myself in and say something new about the
interesting debate about the “original understanding of original intent,” H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985), but rather to use the available information about that original understanding to see whether it allowed for the use of comparative constitutional materials. For comments on H. Jefferson Powell’s article, see, for example, Hans
W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001
(1991); Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of “This
Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177 (1987); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions
of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1989); Charles A.
Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988); and
William J. Michael, The Original Understanding of Original Intent: A Textual Analysis, 26 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 201 (2000).
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influence on the Founders, and nowhere did they indicate that these
insights would be restricted just to 1787. Rather, their acceptance of
certain universalist intellectual ideas and their interest in the experiential
lessons of political science seem to indicate that they wanted comparative
materials to always be used.
The influence of comparative law on the Founding has received a good
deal of scholarly attention.174 This discussion will not rehearse old arguments about the influence of comparative constitutional law on the
Founders, but will simply discuss the consensus of the literature in terms of
its relationship to refined comparativism. It is fair to say that the major
works on the comparativist influence on the Founding175 agree that not
blackletter comparative law, but rather comparative constitutional theory,
influenced the drafting of the Constitution, especially the radical Whig
interpretation of the British Constitution, an interpretation coming from
the works of Harrington, Milton, and Sidney, and extending to such eighteenth century thinkers as John Trenchard, Thomas Gordon, Richard Price,
Benjamin Hoadley, and James Burgh. In general, the literature agrees that
there were three main comparativist influences on the Founders: (1) political theorists of the Enlightenment, including Locke, Montesquieu, Voltaire,
Rousseau, Beccaria, Grotius, and Vattel; (2) philosophical and literary
works of classical antiquity, including the history of the Roman Republic as
depicted by Cicero, Plutarch, Sallust, and Tacitus (or as it appeared in such
modern works as Addison’s Cato); and (3) common law lawyers, including
Coke, Bacon, Hale, and Blackstone. While it is true that this was much of
the “law” out there at the time, there was also a very well-developed
American jurisprudence and series of cases. These were available not
through traditional case reporters but through other sources of legal
174.
E.g., David A.J. Richards, Revolution and Constitutionalism in America, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 577, 584–86 (1993) (discussing the Founders’ use of the comparative political science of
Machiavelli, Harrington, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Ferguson, and Millar).
175.
The classic account is GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969). I have also looked at the following works: 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE
FOUNDING ERA (Charles Hyneman & Donald Lutz eds., 1983); BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967) [hereinafter BAILYN, ORIGINS];
BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1968); CARL BECKER, THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1922); LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE
REVOLUTION IN THE LAW (Hendrik Hartog ed., 1981); PETER ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775–1787
(1983); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1986); CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966); MORTON WHITE,
PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987); GARRY WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978); and GORDON S. WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991).
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reporting. Still, instead of using that body of knowledge, the fact that the
Founders looked to comparative knowledge—and more specifically to comparative sources beyond simply the traditional English sources (Blackstone,
Coke)—is quite telling.
Although these comparative sources of influence hardly form a coherent
picture of constitutional thought, several generalizations about comparativist influence can be made. First, natural law and its revelation of
universalist truths influenced the Founders:
[F]or American judges in the late eighteenth century, the sources of
fundamental law were as open-ended as they were in English opposition theory. The colonists inherited a tradition that provided not
only a justification for judicial review but also guidelines for its exercise. As Bolingbroke proposed in theory and the new American
states translated into action, judges were to look to natural law and
the inherent rights of man, as well as to the written constitution, in
determining the validity of a statute. Where the written constitution
affirmatively addressed a problem—most often in governmental
structure cases . . . but even in cases . . . where the constitution provided clear protection of individual rights—it was dispositive, but in
176
other cases, judges looked outside the written constitution.

This interest in natural law appears in many places after the enactment of
the Constitution.177
Comparativist inquiry under natural law helped reveal these universalist truths by looking to the thoughts of others. These “inherent rights of
man” could be revealed through comparativist inquiry either at the time
of constitutional drafting or of constitutional interpretation by looking to
the revealed truths of natural law and reason as others had discovered them.
176.
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1145–
46 (1987). My goal here is not to involve myself in the extensive debate about the role of natural
law at the Founding. There already exists an extensive and through literature on this topic. E.g.,
Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907
(1993); Sherry, supra. My only point is that whatever one may think about the exact role of natural law in the Founding, it is fairly clear that it at least played some role.
177.
Several of the earliest and most important cases debating the power of the courts to
review statutes (involving many important figures of the early Republic) invoked natural law
claims. Alexander Hamilton’s argument in Rutgers v. Waddington concerned a claim that a New
York statute violated the law of nations. Brief No. 6 for Waddington, Rutgers v. Waddington
(N.Y. City Mayor’s Ct. 1784), reprinted in 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 362, 368 (1964). Remember, of
course, that Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), featured a debate over the uses of natural
law. Justice Salmon P. Chase for the Court wrote that laws “contrary to the great first principles
of the social compact,” id. at 388, cannot be upheld by a court of law. Justice James Iredell concurred to argue “that whatever the legislative power chose to enact, would be lawfully enacted.”
Id. at 398 (Iredell, J., concurring).
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Others, such as Pufendorf, have advocated looking at texts from different
cultures because of the belief that such analysis was the means to discover
natural laws. Identifying commonalities or differences among legal systems
allows the comparativist to see universal, natural laws.178
The Founders also seemed to share a belief in the “science of politics,”179 an idea that experience and common sense could help constitutional actors form a “more perfect Union.”180 Publius sought to control the
excesses of popular government through “scientific” means. In Federalist
No. 9, Alexander Hamilton, as Publius, wrote: “The science of politics,
however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The
efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not
known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients.”181 A “science of politics” philosophy would also not distinguish between drafting and interpreting—in deciding on the best interpretation of constitutional language, the
experience of other countries could sometimes shed light on what experience demonstrates to be effective strategies of constitutional policy. The
Founders thought the Constitution would be interpreted using the lessons
of experience, and comparative constitutional law provides a rich set of
experiences from which to draw in making decisions.182 The Federalist
Papers use the insights of comparative constitutional law throughout,
mentioning Spain eight times and the Netherlands six times, for example.
States debating the ratification of the Constitution also looked to other
countries as extra data points and assumed that such comparative data
would be used well into the future.183
The central documents of the Founding also seem to indicate that the
Founders used comparativism and intended that subsequent interpreters, in
addition to the original drafters, would use comparative constitutional law.
First of all, consider the Declaration of Independence, which has generally
either been ignored or dismissed by those looking to interpret the
178.
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS 16-25 (1970).
179.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also WOOD, supra note 175, at 593–96 (discussing the “science of politics” used by the Founders);
Martin Diamond, The Federalist, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 659, 669 (Leo Strauss
& Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987) (describing “Publius” as a spokesman for the new “science of
politics” and as making “an important addition to [that] science”).
180.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
181.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 179 at 72.
182.
See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 143–83 (1985).
183.
E.g., JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 191 (William S. Hein, 1996) (1891) (looking to how
European countries structure their legislatures).
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Constitution,184 whether by constitutional thinkers from the left,185 right,186
or center.187 The Declaration itself speaks of a “decent respect for the
188
opinions of mankind,” and thereby seems to welcome the use of comparative inquiry in interpreting law as well as drafting it.189
Indeed, given that several of the prominent schools of thought that
dominated the thinking of the Founders welcomed the use of comparative
constitutional law, that the Founders themselves used comparative constitutional law, and that several cases in the early Republic made reference
to ways of thinking that would embrace the use of comparative
constitutional law, there must be clear and compelling evidence to support
Justice Scalia’s distinction between the use of comparative constitutional law
in the writing and interpretation of the Constitution. Such evidence does
not appear.
According to either contemporary version of constitutional originalism, the evidence from the Founding seems to support the contemporary
usage of comparative materials by judges. First, consider the 1780s version
of originalism, which focuses solely on what the Founders thought at that
time to see what they would do today, without giving this intergenerational
effort any “translation.”190 This version of originalism would not make the
Founders aware of other subsequent developments—in other words, given
what they knew, said, and did then, how would they answer this one particular constitutional question? The evidence seems to indicate that the
184.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975) (making no reference
to the Declaration); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990) (no reference);
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 266 (1997) (one reference); MICHAEL J. PERRY,
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982) (no reference); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-3, at 1309 (2d ed. 1988) (one reference);
MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
45 (1988) (one reference). But see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
65–68 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the Declaration as the source of constitutional “principle”).
185.
E.g., ELY, supra note 89, at 49 (mentioning the Declaration once); WILLS, supra note
175, at 325 (describing the purpose of the Declaration as “securing . . . foreign aid in the ongoing
war effort”). Mark Tushnet’s recent book does make extensive reference to the Declaration.
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS passim (1999).
186.
E.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 87 (1977) (arguing that the
Declaration is not an important part of constitutional interpretation); Lino A. Graglia, Judicial
Activism: Even on the Right, It’s Wrong, PUB. INT., Spring 1989, at 57, 71 (presenting the
Constitution as a rejection of the ideas of the Declaration).
187.
E.g., DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 84 (1953) (arguing
that the Declaration is not an aspect of relevant American constitutional “political philosophy”).
188.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
189.
This would appear especially true in the contemporary setting, when so many countries
have developed sophisticated liberal democratic constitutional systems that there would be
enough countries whose opinions were in fact entitled to this “decent respect.”
190.
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
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Founders used comparative constitutional law in drafting the Constitution
and would have welcomed its usage in interpreting the Constitution, again
with the limitations of refined comparativism—when domestic sources are
relatively unclear, and when the comparative materials can be of some use.
In Federalist No. 18, for example, Hamilton says, “I have thought it not
superfluous to give the outlines of this important portion of history; both
because it teaches more than one lesson, and because, as a supplement . . . it
emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy
among the members, than to tyranny in the head.”191 Hamilton later
defends the relevance of these comparative lessons: “I make no apology for
having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these federal precedents.
Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they
ought to be [examined as] . . . important truth[s].”192
This usage of experiential bases as the justification for comparative
constitutional law pervades the Federalist Papers, including those that focus
specifically on the judiciary: “Upon the whole, there can be no room to
doubt that the convention acted wisely in copying from the models of those
constitutions which have established good behavior as the tenure of judicial
offices . . . . The experience of Great Britain affords an illustrious comment
on the excellence of the institution.”193 Experience was to be the lodestar
of constitutional decisionmaking, and this notion supports the use of
comparative materials in both the drafting and interpretation of the
Constitution.194 The common law in use at the time of the Founding and in

191.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 18, at 111 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
192.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 20, at 138 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
193.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
194.
The Federalist Papers open with the statement that the people of New York, and
through them the entire American nation, were deciding “whether societies of men are really
capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The Founders wanted to learn
from experience and political science, and did not differentiate between learning from experience
in writing a constitution and interpreting a constitution. Indeed, every Federalist Paper that
discusses the distinctiveness of the American experience also makes sure to note that this
experience has precedents and relatives, and can learn from the experience of those abroad and
indeed has learned from foreign systems in creating the new American system. Compare THE
FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 85 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the “fabrics
of governments [in the United States] . . . have no model on the face of the globe” and that the
revolution meant that the United States was following a “new and more noble course”), with id. at
101–02 (arguing that the United States should use the experience of Germany and other European countries in crafting its system of government).
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the next several decades was itself a relatively eclectic mix of materials,195
including cases from other countries196 and other “sources of truth,” such as
197
198
Therefore, under the
Christianity, experience, and common sense.
purely 1780s version of originalism, the evidence seems to indicate that
interpretation in general and constitutional interpretation in particular
used comparative legal sources, and that there was no Scalia-like distinction
drawn between the use of comparative constitutional materials in drafting a
Constitution and in interpreting one.199
195.
William Blackstone discussed the common law as including the thoughts of “learned
sages of the profession.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *64.
196.
The common law in use at the time of the Founding examined cases from Britain and
other British colonies, and there is no indication that this reference to comparative sources was
solely because British Royalist judges instructed American common law judges to use comparative
materials.
197.
In 1844, the Supreme Court itself recognized that the “Christian religion is a part of
the common law of Pennsylvania.” Vidal v. Philadelphia, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 198 (1844). A
number of states explicitly recognized that the common law included Christianity and other eclectic
sources. Courts in Alabama, Goree v. State, 71 Ala. 7 (1881); Arkansas, Shover v. State, 10 Ark.
259 (1850), Delaware, State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553 (1837); North Carolina, Melvin v.
Easley, 52 N.C. 378, 382–83 (1860); Pennsylvania, Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle
394 (Pa. 1824); South Carolina, City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.)
508 (1846); and Tennessee, Bell v. State, 31 Tenn. 42, 44–47 (1851), recognized that Christianity
was part of the common law. Treatise writers also stated that Christianity was part of the
common law, and that the common law could include a wide range of sources, citing these state
cases as support. They went on to argue that judges interpreting the Constitution, just like judges
creating the common law, could use a range of sources. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 472 (Boston, Little, Brown, 1868); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A
TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17 (New York, J.S. Voorhies, 1857); CHRISTOPHER
G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 167
(St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co., 1886); Joseph Story, Christianity a Part of the Common
Law, 9 AM. JURIST 9 (1833). In fact, immediately after the Constitution was ratified, there were a
number of common law cases that cited to comparative law and mentioned the benefits of using
comparative law in American law.
198.
Supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text.
199.
The 1780s version of originalism only allows one to look at materials from that time to
decide what the Founders would do today. Still, this version of originalism supports using not
only comparative materials from that time, but also using comparative materials from today. For
example, to best understand French law at the time, we need to look at what has happened in
French law since then and contemporary French law. There are a few examples of Court decisions
using comparative constitutional law in the early Republic, for example, Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar
v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (holding that “[t]he decisions of the Courts of every
country, will be received, not as authority, but with respect”), but nowhere near the number of
cites to comparative constitutional law that would occur in later decades and in the next century.
This is not at all surprising, however, considering the small number of functioning constitutional
courts in the early nineteenth century. Indeed, what is surprising is the use of comparative constitutional law at all during that period of time, considering the relative dearth of comparative materials. The ratio of uses of comparative constitutional law to the available materials (especially
when one considers how much harder it was to obtain foreign materials than it is now) compared
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Second, consider the intergenerational or translation200 version of
originalism: Given what the Founders did and said, if we told them what
has happened since then, what would they do—would they look at comparative materials? Given all of the evidence above about their preferences
for experience and their decent respect for the opinions of mankind, it
appears that they would be even more comparativist than at the Founding
because of the development of many mature liberal constitutional democracies. Indeed, the notion of a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, as
many have noted, was premised on the fact that the opinions must indeed
be held by “mankind”—by sophisticated members of the liberal world
community.201 Under either version of originalism, one can see the acceptability of refined comparativism. The difficulty of creating a constitutional
system led the Founders to look to comparative constitutional law, and to
look to comparative sources of information that had the least amount of
contextual problems.
B.

Founding Through the Civil War

Before the adoption of the Reconstruction amendments, there are
additional examples of American judges using comparative constitutional law
to help them decide cases. Initially, judges referred to Roman law, civil law,
202
James Wilson’s influential 1791
and English common law extensively.
203
Law Lectures also use comparative constitutional law to help interpret the
Constitution.204 Wilson, generally an important but neglected Framer,205
cited Pufendorf twenty-nine times, Grotius ten times, Vattel ten times, and

to now indicates that the Court actually made lots of use of comparative constitutional law in the
early Republic.
200.
E.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 88 (1994).
201.
This may be one way of overcoming the originalist argument that the Founders would
not have looked to comparative constitutional materials because of their cultural exceptionalism
attitudes.
202.
See Roscoe Pound, The Influence of the Civil Law in America, 1 LA. L. REV. 1, 2–7
(1938); see also M.H. HOEFLICH, ROMAN AND CIVIL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLOAMERCIAN JURISPRUDENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1997).
203.
1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
204.
Id. at 41.
205.
A number of twentieth century efforts have been made to elevate James Wilson to the
status of some of the other Founders. Randolph G. Adams has made some of the most important
efforts. JAMES WILSON, SELECTED POLITICAL ESSAYS OF JAMES WILSON (Randolph G. Adams
ed., 1930); Randolph G. Adams, The Legal Theories of James Wilson, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 337 (1920).
C.P. Smith has written the only full-length biography of Wilson. C.P. SMITH, JAMES WILSON:
FOUNDING FATHER, 1742–1798 (1956).
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Burlamqui four times in his sections on interpreting the Constitution.206 In
the first volume of Joseph Story on the Constitution, there are nineteen
citations of Vattel, six of Heineccius, three of Burlamqui, two of Grotius,
and two of Rutherford.207 Also, with the explosion of the American
common law, judges generally used eclectic interpretive methods that did
sometimes look to comparative sources as part of settling a case.208
C.

After the Civil War

1.

Relations Between Levels and Branches of Government: Federalism
and Separation of Powers

Justice Felix Frankfurter, perhaps the most active comparativist in the
history of the Court, used refined comparativism to address federalism and
separation of powers issues throughout his time on the Court. Justice
Frankfurter would first see whether or not there was a clear answer from
American sources, and then would look abroad, making sure that contextu209
alized differences were minimal by looking at the “kindred problems” that
other countries faced.210 In those cases, Justice Frankfurter would treat the
answers of other constitutional systems to a question the Court faced as
206.
Again, because James Wilson did have a range of American legal ideas he could reference, his numerous references to comparative legal ideas are quite revealing.
207.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987). Joseph Story makes references to these sources but does not indicate that these sources
are important only because they may have impacted the drafting of the Constitution.
208.
See ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 24–26 (1938).
209.
E.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 325–26 n.1 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251 n.1 (1946); Polish Nat’l Alliance v. NLRB, 322
U.S. 643, 649–50 (1944); State Tax Comm’n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 182–85 (1942)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
210.
In the area of federal-state relations, for example, Justice Felix Frankfurter invoked the
similarities between the federalism of the United States, Canada, and Australia to analyze their
rules regarding intergovernmental tax immunity. In one particular case, Justice Frankfurter stated
that:
In respect to the problem we are considering, the constitutional relation of the Dominion of Canada to its constituent Provinces is the same as that of the United States to the
States. A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada is therefore pertinent. In City
of Vancouver v. Attorney-General of Canada [1944] S.C.R. 23, that Court denied the
Dominion’s claim to immunity in a situation precisely like this, as I believe we should
deny the claim of the Government.
United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 198 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see
also Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(noting that the intergovernmental tax immunity case before the Court raises the “same legal
issues” as in Australia and Canada under provisions of their constitutional acts). For an even
earlier example of the Court using comparative constitutional law, see Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168 (1880), a case dealing with the contempt power of the U.S. House of Representatives.
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relevant, sometimes even treating those comparative sources as precedents.211 At other times, Justice Frankfurter would use negative comparativism, claiming that American commitments were defined by our
212
constitutional differences from other federal structures.
In separation of powers cases, Justice Frankfurter also turned to comparative constitutional law sources. In New York v. United States,213 Justice
Frankfurter wrote for the Court in upholding the right of Congress to tax
the state of New York on its sale of mineral waters. After finding American
sources did not provide a clear answer, Justice Frankfurter stated that in
analyzing the power of the United States over state activities, “[t]he essential nature of the problem cannot be hidden by an attempt to separate
manifestations of indivisible governmental powers . . . . The present case
illustrates the sterility of such an attempt.”214 Frankfurter later referred to
215
the law of Argentina, as well as to “[a]ttempts along similar lines to solve
kindred problems arising under the Canadian and Australian
Constitutions”216 which “proved a barren process . . . . Even where the
Constitution of a federal system explicitly deals with the problem of
intergovernmental taxation, as in Brazil, litigation is not escaped and nice
distinctions have to be made.”217
Notice the parallels with refined comparativism—Frankfurter notes
the difficulty of the case, and in crafting a legal principle looks to countries
with minimal contextual differences, those countries that have faced “kindred problems”218 and have similar systems of federalism.219 Frankfurter’s
211.
E.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583–84 n.5 (1946) (noting the barrenness of the “sovereign/proprietary” distinction in other federal systems for purposes of intergovernmental tax immunity); O’Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 281 nn.6, 8, 282 (1939) (referring
to foreign precedents in determining the imposition of an income tax on judges’ salaries was
constitutional); Graves, 306 U.S. at 490–91 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing for the
abandonment of tax immunity doctrine on the basis of other federal systems).
212.
E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 408 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (comparing
the scope of federal judicial review with other federal systems); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959) (granting federal maritime jurisdiction while noting that
“[s]uch a system is not an inherent requirement of a federal government”); Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 304 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (upholding the states’ ability to
regulate marriage and divorce, despite contrary foreign federal systems).
213.
326 U.S. 572 (1946).
214.
Id. at 580.
215.
Id. at 580 n.4.
216.
Id. at 583 n.5.
217.
Id.
218.
Supra note 209.
219.
When contextual differences were too great, Frankfurter decided against using comparative constitutional law, or would use negative comparativism to argue for a certain understanding
of the American Constitution based on what it was not—most of the time dealing with federalism
issues. Supra note 212.
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opinions also represented a broadening of the relevant countries that the
Court looked at in its process of using comparative constitutional law.
Although the Court had long used a thin version of genealogical comparativism, looking only to England, Frankfurter frequently looked to countries
that had similar legal systems and faced similar legal issues, regardless of
their historical and political relationship to England and the United States.
Some of the most important cases during the early twentieth century
featured the use of comparative constitutional law. In Muller v. Oregon,220
Louis Brandeis introduced the now-famous “Brandeis brief.”221 In attempting
to prove a particular constitutional fact—reasonableness—Brandeis, acting
as counsel for the state of Oregon, called attention to foreign statutes that
imposed restrictions on the number of hours that women may work. He
cited statutes from Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Austria, Holland,
Italy, and Germany.
Then follow extracts from over ninety reports of committees, bureaus
of statistics, commissioners of hygiene, inspectors of factories, both in
this country and in Europe, to the effect that long hours
of labor are dangerous for women, primarily because of their special
physical organization. The matter is discussed in these reports in
222
different aspects, but all agree as to the danger.

Brandeis minimizes contextual differences by noting that these countries
are all basically addressing the issue of the effect of “‘long hours of labor’”223
on women, and although there are some differences,224 the positive comparativism is appropriate because of the basic similarities.
Brandeis’s use of comparative constitutional law found support in the
opinion for the Court of Justice David Brewer. Justice Brewer noted that
the “present case”225 was difficult, and therefore it “may not be amiss”226 for
the Court “to notice legislation as well as expression of opinion from
sources other than judicial sources.”227 Justice Brewer recognized the persuasive authority of these sources, stating that they are not “technically

220.
221.

208 U.S. 412 (1908).
For a discussion of the idea of the “Brandeis brief,” see, for example, LEONARD BAKER,
BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY (1984); PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS:
JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE (1984); and Mary Murphy Schroeder, The Brandeis Legacy, 37 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 711 (2000).
222.
Muller, 208 U.S. at 419 n.1.
223.
Id. (quoting Brandeis brief).
224.
Id. (stating that “‘[t]he matter is discussed in these reports in different aspects’” (quoting Brandeis brief)).
225.
Id. at 419.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.

49:2

Fontana

Fontana Handcrafted.doc

(11/19/01 8:34 PM)

586

49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 539 (2001)

speaking, authorities”228 but that these sources “are significant [as proof] of a
widespread belief.”229
2.

Individual Versus the State

The Court also turned to refined comparativism as a means of adjudicating cases that dealt with the rights of the individual. In the 1893 Fong
Yue Ting v. United States230 case, for example, the Court debated the relevance of comparative constitutional law in deciding a case dealing with
a statute that authorized the deportation of Chinese laborers who did not
possess a required residency certificate unless, on the testimony of at least
one “white witness,”231 they met the conditions to excuse them from the
certificate requirement.232 The Court upheld this statute in opinions that
featured an interesting debate about the uses of comparative constitutional
law. In order to determine the exact scope of the individual right, the
Court looked to the practice of “every sovereign and independent nation”233
and decided that all nations have the “right”234 to expel aliens. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Brewer used negative comparativism, finding
that “[t]he governments of other nations have elastic powers—ours is fixed
and bounded by a written constitution. The expulsion of a race may be
within the inherent powers of a despotism.”235 Also dissenting, Justice
Stephen Field argued that “even if that power [of deportation of resident
aliens] were exercised by every government of Europe, it would have no
bearing in these cases,”236 but then went on to use negative comparativism
to examine the practice of, among others, Russia in banishing Jews as an
example of “an act of barbarity”237 that the U.S. Constitution did not
permit. The U.S. Constitution, according to Justice Field, mandated that
“no power to perpetuate such barbarity is to be implied from the nature of
228.
Id.
229.
The Court did not always use comparative constitutional law when it might have been
helpful. Compare Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating a federal law designed,
through exemptions, to require limits on child labor), with Rex v. Barger (1908) 6 C.L.R. 41
(Austr.) (holding that “implied prohibitions” of the Constitution—to protect state authority and
to regulate labor conditions—invalidated federal tax on manufactured goods designed, though
exemptions, to impose minimal working conditions requirement).
230.
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
231.
Id. at 729.
232.
Id.
233.
Id. at 711.
234.
Id.
235.
Id. at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
236.
Id. at 757 (Field, J., dissenting).
237.
Id.
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our government, and certainly is not found in any delegated powers under
the Constitution.”238
One of the major debates about individual liberties following the Civil
War, the extent of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the
states,239 included many references to comparative constitutional law.240
Cold War constitutional cases included instances of both positive and negative refined comparativism. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer,241 the
Court rejected the argument that President Harry Truman had inherent
constitutional authority to issue an executive order seizing private steel
mills because of the emergency situation created by the Korean War.
Frankfurter concurred to argue that fascist dictatorships in Europe are a
reason to constrain presidential power because they demonstrate the
possibilities of executive excess.242 Justice Robert Jackson wrote that
243
negative examples from “our own times” of executive powers in

238.
239.

Id.
For examples of scholarship on this debate, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); and MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
240.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s formulation that all rights “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), should be incorporated against
the states led Justices to usually look to the practices of other “English-speaking peoples.”
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–
28 (1949)); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (attempting
to understand privacy in the home regarding the use of contraceptives by looking to “common
understanding throughout the English-speaking world”); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155,
167 (1955) (arguing that the rules on prosecution for contempt of Congress are governed by
“long-standing tradition here and in other English-speaking nations”); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (looking to the “canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples”); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (looking to the standards of decency “in a civilized society”); Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 234 (1945) (holding that domicile for constitutional purposes be treated
as “an historic notion common to all English-speaking courts”); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 413–14 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that “[t]he safeguards of ‘due process of
law’ and ‘the equal protection of the laws’ summarize the history of freedom of English-speaking
peoples running back to Magna Carta and reflected in the constitutional development of our people”); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366 (1916) (concluding that the
Constitution embodies “‘only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all
English-speaking communities’” (quoting Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903))); Harriman v.
ICC, 211 U.S. 407, 419 (1908) (holding that the power to require testimony is usual “in Englishspeaking countries at least”). Justice Hugo Black argued that if the Court was to use comparative
constitutional law to discover truly fundamental rights, it should look to the practices of all people, not just “English-speaking peoples.” Rochin, 342 U.S. at 176 (Black, J., concurring). The
Court looked to comparative constitutional law from the first moment it faced the incorporation
question. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 522–32 (1884).
241.
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
242.
Id. at 593–94 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
243.
Id. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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totalitarian governments were helpful evidence in deciding the case.244 In
Rogers v. Richmond,245 a key case leading to Miranda v. Arizona,246 the Court
elaborated on the “voluntariness” standard governing the admissibility of
247
confessions. Frankfurter used a form of negative comparativism to argue
that “ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system—a system in
which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely
secured and may not by [its own] coercion prove its charge against an
accused out of his own mouth.”248 In a later case, the fact that the British
did not use the exclusionary rule was used as a reason not to apply it against
249
the states.
A number of Cold War cases looked to the practice of other democracies to help the Court resolve difficult issues surrounding the scope of individual liberties.250 The Court, for example, looked to comparative
constitutional law to decide the permissibility of the punishment of those

244.
Id.
245.
365 U.S. 534 (1961).
246.
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Indeed, Miranda itself involved significant discussions of comparative constitutional law. The majority spends approximately five pages discussing foreign experience
with providing warnings to suspects. Id. at 486–90. The discussion parallels Frankfurter’s opinion
in an earlier case. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581–84 (1961).
Miranda featured a debate not just about comparative constitutional doctrine but also about
the uses of comparative constitutional law. Id. at 521 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that comparative constitutional law is not relevant in this case because of structural differences such as the fact
that other systems give prosecutors advantages that they do not have in the United States).
247.
Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540 (“[C]onvictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, that is, the product of coercion, either physical or psychological,
cannot stand.”).
248.
Id. at 541. This Frankfurter opinion might actually be used as evidence of the problems
that American judges might have in analyzing developments in foreign countries—the proper
contrast, rather than the one Frankfurter makes, is between the adversarial system of the
common law and the accusatorial Continental model. Frankfurter frequently used comparative
constitutional law in his constitutional criminal procedure opinions. E.g., Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 199 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that confessions should not be admitted
because the “standards of decency deeply felt and widely recognized in Anglo-American jurisdictions” means that such confessions would not have been admitted in criminal trials in Canada,
Australia, or India). Other Justices also made reference to comparative constitutional law in their
constitutional criminal procedure opinions. E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465–72 (1942)
(looking to a variety of comparative constitutional sources in deciding that the Constitution does
not require the appointment of counsel in a state criminal trial).
249.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29–30 (1949).
250.
E.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (finding that “[c]rimes against nature” is
not vague among “English speaking people”); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966)
(finding the use of informers “from time immemorial”); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584
(1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (analyzing freedom of speech as an element essential to all
democracies); Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 189 (1951) (Reed, J.,
dissenting) (looking to the actions taken by other democracies to “control disloyalty among government employees”)
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who publicly criticized sitting judges.251 In Trop v. Dulles,252 the Court confronted a case in which the plaintiff had lost his citizenship because of his
conviction by a military court martial of desertion from the U.S. Army
during the middle of war. The Court held that a statute authorizing expatriation of individuals convicted of desertion in wartime was beyond the
power of Congress. Chief Justice Earl Warren’s plurality opinion noted the
difficulty of the case and looked at the practice of other nations to conclude that the loss of citizenship was unconstitutional, arguing that
“banishment [is] a fate universally decried by civilized people,”253 and that
other countries deplored statelessness and “only two countries”254 in the
world “impose[d] denationalization as a penalty for desertion.”255
In McGowan v. Maryland,256 the majority opinion of Chief Justice
Warren analyzed the long history of Sunday legislation against the background of a British bill of 1936 and the parliamentary debates in the House
of Commons as well as in relation to the labor practices of other countries.257 Frankfurter concurred to comment that “[e]ven on the Continent
the forces which in the latter half of the nineteenth century pressed for the
amelioration of the working conditions of the laborer expressed themselves
in part in Sunday legislation,”258 citing the German, Austrian, Swiss, Danish,
Norwegian, and Russian experiences as well as the reports of the Congres
International de Repos Hebdomadaire.259 In Poe v. Ullman,260 the Court had
to rule on the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use
251.
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 284–88 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 23 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
252.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
253.
Id. at 102.
254.
Id. at 103.
255.
Id. For other examples of the use of comparative constitutional law in cruel and
unusual punishment cases, see, for example, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988)
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion), which looked to “leading members of the Western European
community” to confirm that it would “offend civilized standards of decency” to execute juveniles
for crimes committed before age sixteen; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982), which
looked at developments in European countries for support of the argument that the death penalty
was unconstitutional as applied to a robber who did not kill or intend to kill; and Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion), which stated that “[i]t is . . . not
irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the
death penalty for rape when death did not ensue.”
256.
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
257.
Id. at 450 n.21.
258.
Id. at 483 n.40 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Frankfurter noted that these countries
were relevant sources for comparative inquiry because of their similar economies and therefore the
minimal contextual differences between the issues as presented to the Court in the United States
and the issues in Europe. Id. at 484.
259.
Id.
260.
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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of contraceptives. The famous Justice John Marshall Harlan dissent in
Poe261 found some of its support in comparative constitutional law:
Although the Federal Government and many States have at one
time or other had on their books statutes forbidding or regulating
the distribution of contraceptives, none, so far as I can find, has made
the use of contraceptives a crime. Indeed, a diligent search has
revealed that no nation, including several which quite evidently
share Connecticut’s moral policy, has seen fit to effectuate that
262
policy by the means presented here.

This use of comparative constitutional law was questioning the means-end
linkage between the stated goal of Connecticut’s statute and the means
used to further that goal. In a footnote, Justice Harlan stated that one can
read that an “[u]nqualified disapproval of contraception is implicit in the
laws of Belgium, . . . France, . . . Ireland, Italy, [and] Spain.”263
Modern substantive due process cases have also used refined comparativism, primarily using the law canvassing method to decide the “constitutional fact” of the fundamentality of the potential liberty interest. In Roe
v. Wade,264 Justice Harry Blackmun “inquired into, and in this opinion
place[d] some emphasis upon”265 the practices of many other countries, from
the Persian Empire to twentieth century European practices.266 In Bowers v.
Hardwick,267 Justice Byron White wrote for the majority and used domestic
law canvassing to note that he was “unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of
268
some 25 States should be invalidated on [the morality] basis,” while Chief
Justice Warren Burger concurred and looked at comparative constitutional
law.269
261.
For instances of cases that adopted the reasoning of Justice John Marshall Harlan’s Poe
dissent, see, for example, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1992), and Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982)
(citing Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent as the source of the principle that the Court balance “the liberty of the individual” and “the demands of an organized society”); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 500–06 (1977) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (noting that in the opinion of four
Justices, Harlan’s Poe dissent is the key statement on judicial review under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 n.17
(1997) (questioning Justice Souter’s reliance, in dissent, on Harlan’s Poe opinion because
“although Justice Harlan’s opinion has often been cited in due process cases, we have never abandoned our fundamental-rights-based analytical method”).
262.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 554–55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
263.
Id. at 555 n.16 (citations omitted).
264.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
265.
Id. at 117.
266.
Id. at 130, 132, 133.
267.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
268.
Id. at 196.
269.
Id. at 196–97 (Burger, J., concurring) (condemning homosexuality as violating ancient
Judeo-Christian morality, as well as ancient Roman law). Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissent criticized
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This brief history of comparative constitutional law shows that the
refined comparativist method has had a long career in American constitutional law. The Founding ethos seems not only to permit the use of
comparative constitutional law, but also to demand it. The subsequent
history of cases at the Supreme Court level has demonstrated the continued
use, and eventual expansion of, the refined comparativist method. All of
the cases note that the issues before them are trying, and that this difficulty
in deciding the case enables the Court to look abroad for solutions. Then,
there is always a reference to the contextual similarities between the issue
and other circumstances in the lending country that make the borrowing
acceptable. Comparative constitutional law is seen as a helpful source that
can lead a court to a decision, but not as a source that is at all binding.
These cases also demonstrate the broader definition of genealogical comparativism that the Court has used—its utilization of comparative constitutional
law has not been limited solely to tracing ancient British legal practices.
Rather, the Court has looked at many countries around the world. In short,
there is some precedent in the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court and
from the Founding for refined comparativism.

V. REFINED COMPARATIVISM AND CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP
Refined comparativism can also be justified no matter what theory of
constitutional law one may adopt or what school of contemporary constitutional scholarship one may believe to be the proper methodology for
studying American constitutional law. This Part explores three basic
notions of what it means to have a constitution, the various schools of
constitutional scholarship associated with these three notions, and the
acceptability of refined comparativism under these schools of scholarship.
First, a constitution can be seen as the document that structures government and society. Second, a constitution can be seen as a document that
allows interpreters to decide cases based on the best moral-philosophical
understanding of the problem confronted by the interpreter. Third, a
constitution can be seen as an embodiment of tradition or of national
character.270 The discussion in Part IV about refined comparativism and
the majority’s interpretations of its sources of comparative law. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
270.
Obviously, many of the schools of constitutional scholarship I make reference to could
be placed into more than one category—for example, law and economics can be seen as a moralphilosophical understanding of the Constitution, and constitutional common law can be seen
as part of the national tradition—but these groupings are not as important as the permissibility of

49:2

Fontana

Fontana Handcrafted.doc

(11/19/01 8:34 PM)

592

49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 539 (2001)

about originalism touches on the acceptability of refined comparativism
under one version of the “constitution as tradition” theory, originalism.
This Part expands on that discussion by presenting other versions of the
“constitution as tradition” theory, and by defending refined comparativism
under the framework of those theories.
A. Constitution as Structure of Government
First of all, a constitution can be seen as a means of organizing society.
Under this view, a constitution should be evaluated in instrumental terms:
271
For example, does it promote efficiency, or do as good a job as possible
of promoting liberty, justice, and the general welfare? According to this
vision of constitutional pragmatism, constitutional structures like federalism
and separation of powers are important only insofar as they promote liberty,
efficiency, or justice. This may also be true of other constitutional structures, including elements of the Bill of Rights.272 Justice Breyer alludes to this
understanding of a constitution in his Printz invocation of comparative
273
constitutional law. Under this view of a constitution, refined comparativism is very helpful, for precisely the reasons included in my discussion
in Part III.A above. Comparative analysis provides the constitutional interpreter with more possible solutions, more data points, and leads to a richer
understanding of one’s own assumptions and structures of reasoning.
Pragmatic concerns about particularism—can one possibly transplant a
constitutional idea or fact from another system into the United States and
make it work?—can be overcome by the structure of refined comparativism.274 The refined comparativist judge is using comparative constitutional
law when contextual differences are at a minimum, and when there is little
reason to be concerned about the applicability of lessons from abroad for
the American experience. Using the insights of an expert, the refined
comparativist judge can handle some of the perplexing issues posed by
transplanting constitutional lessons across borders.
Negative comparativism may be especially helpful in promoting this
vision of constitutional pragmatism. Comparative constitutional analysis
refined comparativism to each school of constitutional scholarship, regardless of what group they
are placed in for the purposes of this argument.
271.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 615–22 (4th ed. 1992).
272.
E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991)
(arguing that many elements of the Bill of Rights can be understood as attempting to promote liberty, efficiency, and justice).
273.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (looking at
the “empirical” consequences of certain constitutional structures).
274.
See also infra Part VII.B.1.
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may point out the types of situations the U.S. Constitution attempts to
avoid, whether it is the nightmares of apartheid,275 the extremes of Nazi
276
277
Germany, or the Siberian gulag. Although the real concern is whether
pathologies will occur here, and therefore the heritage of Dred Scott278 and
Korematsu279 are helpful cases to study, surely the types of situations
that generated pathologies abroad can be helpful sources of analysis for
an American court attempting to avoid creating a similar outcome.
Furthermore, it can be argued that one of the basic elements of American
constitutionalism is a concern for avoiding the type of horrific pragmatic
outcomes that negative comparativism uses comparative constitutional law
to make sure the United States avoids. The U.S. Constitution is a way of
guarding against the parade of horribles—think of, for example, First
Amendment doctrine rejecting “content regulations” and “prior restraints”
because of the history of governmental and private intolerance of popular
and unpopular speech, or the fear of racial classifications because of the
American experience with slavery and societal racism.
Another approach to contemporary constitutional scholarship that can
be seen as a way of organizing government and society is the “constitutional

275.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (finding that racial reapportionment “bears
an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid”); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
633 n.1 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (invoking race-conscious definitions used in Nazi
Germany and South Africa); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 507–08 n.6 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (analogizing South Africa and Nazi Germany precedents to current efforts to determine race for legal purposes).
276.
E.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 443 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting a
state court opinion referring to suspicionless searches as techniques used by “Hitler’s Berlin” (citation omitted)). In the late 1940s (and in particular in opinions authored by Justice Robert
Jackson after his service as a special prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials), the Court issued many
decisions that discussed the importance of constitutional restraints on limitless searches as a
means of preventing the police excesses that were commonplace in totalitarian regimes. For
examples of these types of post-Nuremberg opinions by Justice Jackson, see Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948), in which he distinguished “our form of government, where officers
are under the law, and the police-state where they are the law,” and United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581, 595 (1948), in which he stated he preferred to allow some criminals to escape punishment to “a too permeating police surveillance.” Cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 225–26 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (objecting to the executive detention
of aliens without a hearing as bearing “unmistakable overtones of the ‘protective custody’ of the
Nazis”).
277.
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (“[The u]ltimate futility of
such attempts to compel coherence [of sentiment] is the lesson of every such effort from the
Roman drive to stamp out Christianity . . . , the Inquisition . . . , the Siberian exiles . . . , down to
the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.”).
278.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (2 How.) 393 (1856).
279.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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common law” approach to understanding constitutional decisions.280 The
constitutional common law approach seems to be a very accurate way of
describing the current state of American constitutional jurisprudence.
Many of the characteristics of traditional common law evolution now
describe constitutional evolution: (1) Significant constitutional doctrinal
changes now only occur after old constitutional doctrines prove unworkable
or after general extralegal changes make old constitutional doctrines inapplicable or incorrect. (2) All theories of constitutional interpretation
respect precedent. Of course, these similarities between the common law
method and contemporary constitutional jurisprudence do not mean that
federal courts still create federal common law. Since the Court decided Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins,281 there has been “no federal general common law,”282
but the Court still has had a role in creating specialized areas of common
283
law.
Given this inevitability of some form of constitutional common law,
refined comparativism becomes acceptable and even desirable. In order to
learn from experience to help courts keep up with rapidly changing social
dynamics, courts need a large range of legal possibilities and data points—
they need as many “laboratories”284 as possible. Also, in making constitutional common law, courts have looked to a wide range of sources
to help them make decisions—general considerations of public policy285 and
other sources286—because courts realize they are creating law. Moreover, in
making law under the vision of constitutional common law, courts realize
that they can overcome their limited fact-finding and legislative abilities by

280.
E.g., HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 127 (1990); David
A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996); Harry H.
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
281.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
282.
Id. at 78.
283.
Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 405–22 (1964).
284.
Supra note 130.
285.
Strauss, supra note 280, at 905–06.
286.
If the Constitution is truly a system of common law, then the recognition that statutes
can now be used in common law judicial decisionmaking even strengthens the argument that
judges can look to comparative constitutional law; the common law has become more eclectic.
Statutes used to be considered an exceptional intrusion into the body of common law judicial
decisions. Compare Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 387–88
(1908), with James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930).
Whenever a statute did not directly apply to the case at hand, therefore, the judge used the
common law. See P.S. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8–12 (1985).
This is the source of the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly
construed. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 32 (2d ed. 1985). Now,
however, statutes are a source of law in American common law.
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relying on experience, the basis of the common law, in looking to another
country’s history addressing a particular issue.
B.

Constitution as Moral-Philosophical System

Another understanding of the Constitution offered in modern constitutional scholarship sees the Constitution as giving life to a moralphilosophical system.
Examples of this include Ronald Dworkin’s
“Hercules,”287 Justice William Brennan’s “living Constitution,”288 and
Benjamin Cardozo’s “sociological jurisprudence.”289 It also probably includes
290
291
the perspectives of critical legal studies, critical race theory, feminist
292
293
theory, libertarianism, and the theory I will examine—civic republicanism. Civic republicanism refers to the ideas given new life by historians like
Bernard Bailyn,294 Gordon Wood,295 and Joyce Appleby.296 Constitutional
scholars inspired by this civic republican revival include Cass Sunstein,297

287.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105–30 (1977).
288.
The phrase “living Constitution” has been cited as Justice William Brennan’s term,
even though he actually did not use the term. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of
Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1101 (1990) (stating that “the living
Constitution” is “one of the many contributions that . . . earned Justice Brennan his place as one
of the most influential Supreme Court Justices in our history”); see also Arlin M. Adams, Justice
Brennan and the Religion Clauses: The Concept of a “Living Constitution,” 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1319,
1320 (1991).
289.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 62, 64 (1921) (distinguishing between the “method of sociology” and the “method of tradition”).
290.
E.g., Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1986).
291.
E.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
292.
E.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989).
293.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
294.
BAILYN, ORIGINS, supra note 175.
295.
WOOD, supra note 175.
296.
JOYCE APPLEBY, INHERITING THE REVOLUTION: THE FIRST GENERATION OF
AMERICANS (2000).
297.
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Beyond]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private
Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 873 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences]; Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1991).
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Bruce Ackerman,298 Frank Michelman,299 and perhaps even Owen Fiss,300 all
of whom argue that the Constitution can best be understood as an
embodiment of civic republican ideals. At bottom, all of these scholars
argue that the Constitution contemplates a civic republican model of
policymaking in which decisions are made in the legislative process through
principled deliberation and reasoned dialogue.301 From this perspective,
refined comparativism can actually help remedy some of the problems of
civic republicanism.
Refined comparativism adds an additional viewpoint to the “principled” public debate. In this way, it makes the debate more likely to reach
the true “public good”302—taking its inspiration from better solution comparative law.303 It adds a distinctive new voice to the public debate, and
because of the modern civic republican’s overwhelming concern with
dialogue,304 this helps enliven the civic republican debate. The civic republican position is that present desires should be open and subject to change
298.
2 ACKERMAN, supra note 175; Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, Storrs Lectures].
299.
Frank I. Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank I. Michelman,
The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Foreword].
300.
Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986); Owen M. Fiss,
The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
Although Owen Fiss might not be as openly republican in his writings as Sunstein, Ackerman and
Michelman, others have called Fiss a civic republican theorist. TUSHNET, supra note 184, at 160–
68. Fiss, like Sunstein and others commonly called civic republicans, dislikes the jury, the central
institution of civic republicanism. Still, the Tushnet book and other materials commonly refer to
Fiss, Sunstein, Michelman, and Ackerman as civic republicans.
301.
Other important scholars have indicated their affinity for the civic republican revival.
SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); TUSHNET, supra note 184, at 17, 187;
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV.
543 (1986).
302.
See, e.g., Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 298, at 1022, 1033; Sunstein, Interest
Groups, supra note 297, at 31–32, 58; Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 297, at 1690–91.
303.
Supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text.
304.
While civic virtue was an essential element of classical republicanism, the new republican theorists barely mention virtue as an indispensable element of civic republicanism. Classical
republicanism viewed virtue as the most essential element of the pursuit of the common good,
while for civic republicans dialogue is the most essential element. This is not to say that contemporary civic republicans ignore virtue, or dislike virtue, but rather that virtue is not the central
ingredient of their vision of civic republicanism. Sunstein writes:
[C]ivic virtue should play a role in political life. There is no mystery to this claim; it
refers simply to the understanding that in their capacity as political actors, citizens and
representatives are not supposed to ask only what is in their private interest, but also
what will best serve the community in general.
Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 297, at 1550. Of all of the major civic republican constitutional
theorists, Michelman focuses the most on virtue. E.g., Michelman, Foreword, supra note 299, at
55–73.
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in light of collective discussion and debate.305 For this openness to be possible and to make it work at its best, the public discussion must feature alternative perspectives and additional information306—one of the primary
strengths of refined comparativism from a civic republican perspective.
Refined comparativism also has a way of strengthening the public
debate, in ways noted earlier, by debunking any sense of false necessity307
308
and bringing into question even the most basic assumptions. It makes all
preferences and ideas open to revision subject to public deliberation.
Moreover, it frees up the public dialogue by inserting the voice of an
“outsider.” Deliberative criticism requires distance; decisionmakers must
be willing to scrutinize their own and their constituents’ preferences.309
This distance can be provided by introducing the voice of an outsider, the
voice of comparative constitutional law. This “outside voice” virtue of
refined comparativism can also help ensure the requirement of the civic
republican precondition of political equality. A “multicultural” civic
republicanism can ensure the representation of diverse viewpoints by giving
voice to the insights of other countries, thereby perhaps publicizing the
feelings of immigrants or of other citizens who still feel attached to their
home countries’ values and jurisprudence. Alexander Hamilton said that
“[t]he oftener [a law] is brought under examination [and] the greater the
diversity [of viewpoints] . . . the less must be the danger of those errors which
flow.”310 Multicultural civic republicanism can also be helped especially by
negative comparativism, which may help generate the minimum
“overlapping consensus”311 necessary as a basic precondition for public
debate. If we all agree that, no matter what, we do not want to be like Nazi
Germany or racist South Africa, that may help generate conversation,
mutual understanding, and respect.

305.
E.g., Samuel Beer, The Strengths of Liberal Democracy, in A PROSPECT OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (William S. Livingston ed., 1979).
306.
This might be one way of overcoming the skepticism of some scholars about civic
republicanism that any efforts to find a notion of the “common good” have always resulted in
“hierarchy, exclusion and alienation.” Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and
Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1612 (1988). Introducing the comparativist voice into civic
republican constitutional discourse would diversify the constitutional discourse, just in case the
domestic civic republican constitutional discourse did not.
307.
Supra note 138 and accompanying text.
308.
Supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text.
309.
Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 297, at 1575 (describing this distance as the “foundation
of contemporary republicanism”).
310.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
311.
Supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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Refined comparativism also fits with the role of education in both liberal and civic republican visions of the state. First, Bruce Ackerman has
described liberal education as follows:
We have no right to look upon future citizens as if we were master
gardeners who can tell the difference between a pernicious weed and
a beautiful flower. A system of liberal education provides children
with a sense of the very different lives that could be theirs—so that,
as they approach maturity, they have the cultural materials available
312
to build lives equal to their evolving conceptions of the good.

The liberal vision of education requires the introduction of a range of perspectives. Courts, playing the role of constitutional educators in their duty
as constitutional interpreters,313 can enhance this eclectic liberal education
by looking to comparative constitutional law.
The civic republican also has a distinctive view of education. Education under civic republicanism is necessary because citizens must use rights
in a certain way, and therefore civic republicans focus on responsibility and
virtue in addition to liberty. The entirely subjectivist education is incompatible with the civic republican idea of citizenship. Civic republican education must recognize that some ways of acting are impermissible and ought to
be discouraged in the educational process. At minimum, there must be
something that civic republican education teaches citizens they should do
and something they should not do. This minimum overlapping consensus
can be provided by negative comparativism, as discussed earlier.314
More importantly, although an education that indoctrinates the citizen only with norms would be part of the totalitarian state, in a multicultural civic republican state citizenship involves principled and rational
deliberation about values and virtue in a world where citizens disagree
about both. The multicultural civic republican state must also then educate
its citizens to think critically. As Amy Gutmann has said, “[c]hildren must
learn not just to behave in accordance with authority but to think critically
about authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal of sharing

312.
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 139 (1980).
Ackerman is not entirely clear on how we can combine this with a parental “right to try to
impress our children with the things that are most important to us,” without violating liberal
principles of neutrality that he holds so dear. Id. at 140.
313.
E.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 961 (1992) (discussing whether the Court can and should educate the public); Eugene V.
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952) (famously
noting that the “Supreme Court is, among other things, an educational body, and the Justices are
inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar”).
314.
Supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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political sovereignty as citizens.”315 Bruce Ackerman argues along similar
lines, asserting that parents have an obligation to provide their children
“with cultural equipment that permits the child to criticize, as well as
affirm, parental ideas.”316 Children must have the ability to “deliberate
critically among a range of good lives and good societies.”317 For refined
comparativism, this means that courts as constitutional educators can help
further the collective ability to think critically by introducing a range of
perspectives and ideas.
C.

Constitution as Tradition/National Character

The Constitution might also be understood as an embodiment of our
basic traditions and national character. This approach has become more
prominent in recent Supreme Court cases. In Washington v. Glucksberg,318
for instance, the Court rejected an argument that persons have a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide because of a “consistent and almost
universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues
explicitly to reject it today.”319 The Court held that the “[n]ation’s history,
legal traditions and practices . . . direct and restrain our exposition of the Due
Process Clause.”320 In the academic literature, this emphasis on tradition is
represented in works that give specific content to the American tradition,
321
such as Bruce Ackerman’s work on “dualist democracy.”
From the Declaration of Independence to the present day, American
constitutional law has looked to comparative constitutional law. It seems
that it is at least some part of the American national character to have a
“decent respect for the opinions of mankind.”322 Also, with the sociolegal
changes mentioned throughout this Article, such as multiculturalism, the
use of comparative constitutional law might actually be mandatory as a
means of discovering the true identity and mores of “We the people.”
Finally, even if one does not accept the comparativist tendencies of the
American national character, or accept the relevance of comparativist insights in a multicultural America, one can still accept refined
315.
Dewey in
13.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
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ACKERMAN, supra note 312, at 117.
GUTMANN, supra note 315, at 44.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Id. at 723.
Id. at 721.
E.g., Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 298, at 1022–24.
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comparativism. The American tradition will not always lead to clear
principles that judges can apply in specific cases. For example, the
American experience may instruct us about the limited role the judiciary is
to play in overseeing sentencing, but does this generate a specific judicial
principle to apply to specific cases?323
Comparative constitutional law can also be used in its role as supplying additional constitutional facts. If there is a specific narrative characterizing the American experience, a court can decide how best to further that
narrative by looking to the experiences of other countries. Whether in its
capacity as generator of judicial principles or of constitutional facts, however, comparative constitutional law can still be helpful by using negative
comparativism to help define the conflicting and sometimes incoherent
American experience.

VI. APPLICATION
In 1992, the Supreme Court heard the case of R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul.324 In that case, Robert Allan Viktora (R.A.V.)325 was convicted under
the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance326 of burning a crudely made
cross on the lawn of an African American family that had moved into a
formerly all-white neighborhood.327 According to the St. Paul ordinance,
anyone who “places on public or private property a symbol, [or] object
. . . including . . . a burning cross . . . which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct.”328 The
Supreme Court struck down the St. Paul statute as interpreted by the
Minnesota Supreme Court because it “prohibit[ed] . . . speech solely on
the basis of the subjects the speech addressed.”329 How would the refined
comparativist have handed this case? The Supreme Court did make brief
reference to comparative constitutional law. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
majority noted that “[f]rom 1791 to the present . . . our society, like other free
but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech
in a few limited areas.”330 There is no reference, however, to the decisions
323.
United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
324.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
325.
At the time of the crime the defendant was a juvenile, so the Court identified him only
by his initials.
326.
ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990), quoted in R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380.
327.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379.
328.
ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02, quoted in R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380.
329.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
330.
Id. at 382–83 (emphasis added).
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of other constitutional courts on hate speech.331 But what would have happened if the Court had used the refined comparativist method—would the
decision have been “better”?
First, a refined comparativist Court would have to look to the
American sources to see if this was indeed a “hard case” that warranted a
look at comparative constitutional law materials. The Court in this case
completely missed the constitutional value conflicts. It construed the case as
all about the First Amendment, when in fact the case turns also on the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Clearly, as Scalia’s opinion
notes, there are important First Amendment values attacked by the St. Paul
statute. These First Amendment concerns about government regulation of
speech are strengthened when one examines the effect that the Fourteenth
Amendment has in restricting the ability of government to regulate
unpopular speech, as Akhil Reed Amar has noted.332 More fundamentally,
however, the Fourteenth Amendment also concerns itself with race and
equality, and Viktora directed his attack against African Americans,
the paradigmatic class protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Thirteenth Amendment also comes into play, because Viktora’s actions
against African Americans may in fact be “badges and incidents”333 of
slavery that a state can properly regulate. Justice Stevens’s opinion does
make some mention of this notion, stating that “[t]he cross-burning in this
case—directed as it was to a single African-American family trapped in
their home—was nothing more than a crude form of physical
intimidation.”334 Viewed in this light, the fact that the statute may be read
to punish only hate crimes against minorities and not hate crimes by
331.
Although Canadian Supreme Court decisions are available in English in major law
libraries (and were accessible on-line through QUICKLAW beginning in 1989), the Canadian
Supreme Court case on hate speech that preceded R.A.V., Regina v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697,
was apparently mentioned in only one of the many briefs filed in R.A.V. (based on an examination of the Table of Authorities of those briefs available on Lexis). Brief Amicus of the National
Black Women’s Health Project in Support of Respondent, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992) (No. 90-7675); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Asian-American Legal Defense and
Education Fund et. al., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675) (listing a 1989 law
review article comparing U.S. and Canadian approaches to hate speech).
332.
Amar, supra note 272, at 1147–52. This only further illustrates the complexity and
difficulty of the case. While the Reconstruction, with its emphasis on equality and race, may
make one lean towards upholding the St. Paul statute, the Reconstruction was also about protecting unpopular speech. These protections for unpopular speech helped shield the black-led
civil rights movement of the 1960s. The most important First Amendment case of recent times,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), ended up protecting unpopular criticism by
blacks. Id. at 256–58. Many of the most important First Amendment cases of the civil rights era
involved African American litigants suing to protect their unpopular speech. HARRY KALVEN,
JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).
333.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 35–36 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
334.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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minorities may be acceptable, because the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments introduce into the Constitution the notion of greater
protection for certain groups or classes than for others.
The Court did not recognize the conflict in American constitutional
values. Perhaps a refined comparativist Court, aware that this was a hard
case, would have been more willing to recognize the existence of a value
conflict than was the R.A.V. Court, which completely missed the equality
values that the St. Paul statute promoted. The refined comparativist Court,
then, would have realized that this case presented a number of difficult
issues, because of the value conflict and because of open-ended constitutional text, and would have started to look to comparative constitutional
law as a possible source of assistance.
A federal judicial system using refined comparativism would have
noted the relevant sources of comparative constitutional law long before
the Supreme Court heard oral arguments and issued its decision in this
particular case, thereby providing the Court with a record on comparative
constitutional law that the Court could have utilized. The Court would
have turned to its context consideration335—are there so many differences,
legal and otherwise, between other countries and the United States that
comparative constitutional law is of no use? The refined comparativist
Court would have looked to these context considerations and decided
that contextual differences exist but are not significant enough to prevent
the use of comparative constitutional law. Most of the countries addressing
the constitutionality of hate speech have broad language in their
constitutions, just as the United States does in its Constitution. Countries
like Canada have a similar culture and also have British common law legal
roots that are quite similar to those of the United States. Although
Canada’s legal system is slightly different, and it never revolted against
the Crown (and indeed served as a safe haven for British Tories), these
differences are not fatal for the refined comparativist. Canada and
Germany, among other countries, also have a history, like the United
States, of protecting the freedom of speech, and a past full of slavery
and racial discrimination.
During the stage of refined comparativism in which a court decides if
there is anything to be gained from looking abroad, it can of course use a
335.
With all of these issues—context consideration, comparative evolutionary advantages
(sociolegal and legal)—the Court would have had a lower court decision on the matter to help it
along. This lower court decision may have simply found that this was not a “hard case” and
therefore there was no need to consult comparative constitutional law. In that instance, the lower
courts would not have assembled any comparative constitutional law materials or made any comment on comparative constitutional law that would have helped the Court.
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foreign law expert. If refined comparativism had been used in the lower
courts, then judges may have used an expert336 and the parties may have
briefed some issues of comparative constitutional law, so the Supreme Court
would have had a record to rely on in deciding whether or not there was
anything to be gained from looking abroad. This record would have
undoubtedly showed that there was a comparative evolutionary legal advantage and a comparative evolutionary sociolegal advantage. In the United
States, prior to 1980 only five states had any type of statutes related to hate
crimes,337 while countries around the world had addressed the issue for some
time. Also, the effectiveness of hate speech regulation programs had been
observed in countries around the world, and contextual developments such
as multiculturalism had been addressed in the opinions of Canadian courts,
for example, long before the U.S. Supreme Court heard this case.

336.
There have been plenty of articles written on the cultural, legal, and historical aspects
of American and Canadian restrictions of hate speech, and on hate speech in general, and therefore there must be some individuals qualified to serve as foreign law experts in this case. For relevant scholarship (though not necessarily by individuals qualified to serve as experts), see, for
example, LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS,
COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH (1995); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 124 (1992); Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207 (1993); Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95; Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Robert C.
Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING
OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 115 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. et al.
eds., 1994); and John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85 KY.
L.J. 9 (1996). Many of these pieces of scholarship also advocate incorporating the Canadian
version of hate speech jurisprudence into American constitutional law. My contribution in this
Article is to view this incorporation in the context of refined comparativism, and make some
different arguments about the virtues of such a borrowing.
This wealth of literature on Canadian and American hate speech has two effects on my
argument. First, it means that my proposal of borrowing from Canadian constitutional law on
hate speech is not new in and of itself, but rather is new in that I use it to illustrate how refined
comparativism works. Second, this wealth of literature means that there would be no problem
finding relevant experts for the litigants and court to use in the trial and appeal.
337.
See Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing
Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 680 (1993). Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia enacted statutes designed to combat the Ku Klux
Klan, and these statutes have been used to address cross burnings and using hoods or masks in
public. Id. at 680 n.32.

49:2

Fontana

Fontana Handcrafted.doc

(11/19/01 8:34 PM)

604

49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 539 (2001)

A. Canada, Hate Speech, and Refined Comparativism
A refined comparativist Court could have used comparative constitutional law both to help it find a workable principle of law to apply and also
to provide it with a series of constitutional facts. Looking to Canada would
be especially helpful in this case. The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, enacted in 1982, “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”338 One of these “rights
and freedoms” subject to that limitation is Charter Section 2(b)’s guarantee
that “[e]veryone has the following fundamental freedoms . . . (b) freedom
of thought, belief, opinion and expression.”339 Charter Section 15(2) speaks
of equality,340 and Charter Section 27 notes that the Charter attempts to
protect the multicultural heritage of Canada.341
The Canadian Supreme Court has applied these provisions in the test
342
created by Regina v. Oakes to create a workable principle to see if a restriction on freedom of speech is permissible. First, the court must determine
whether the purpose of the governmental intrusion on the freedom is so
compelling as to justify limiting the right.343 The means chosen to limit
that right must be proportional to the purpose promoted: (1) they must be
344
rationally connected to the objective of the limitation, (2) they must
345
impair the protected rights as little as possible, and (3) the effects of the
338.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. A (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 1.
339.
Id. §2.
340.
Id. §15; see also Colleen Sheppard, Equality in Context: Judicial Approaches in Canada
and the United States, 39 U.N.B.L.J. 110, 113 (1990).
341.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. A (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §27 (“This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and
enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”).
342.
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 135–42 (deciding that a statutory presumption that possession
of narcotics by defendants means that trafficking by defendant can be inferred violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and was
unconstitutional because it was not “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”).
343.
Chief Justice Brian Dickson, the author of the majority opinion in Keegstra, noted in
Oakes that this
standard must be high in order to ensure that objectives which are trivial or discordant
with the principles integral to a free and democratic society do not gain section 1 protection. It is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are
pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be characterized as
sufficiently important.
Id. at 138.
344.
Id. at 139.
345.
This has obvious similarities with the American “least restrictive alternative” standard,
although there are some differences. Regina v. Edward Books and Art, Ltd. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713,
772 (using language that the restriction on the individual freedom must impair freedom as little
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state regulation on individual liberty must be proportional to the governmental objective.346
The Canadian Supreme Court applied the Oakes test in a number of
hate speech cases, most notably Regina v. Keegstra,347 a case decided before
R.A.V. that upheld a criminal prosecution for hate speech. In Keegstra, the
defendant, James Keegstra, taught social studies in an Alberta high school.
He argued to his students that history could be understood through analyzing the “International Jewish Conspiracy,” which he claimed has been
responsible for many of the world’s problems. Keegstra was dismissed as a
teacher and later criminally prosecuted for promoting racial hatred. The
Canadian Supreme Court found that Keegstra’s Section 2(b) rights had
been implicated,348 and therefore it had to decide whether the limitation on
those rights could be justified under the Oakes test.
The Canadian Court generally agreed that the purpose or objective of
the limitation on freedom of speech was a “pressing and substantial concern
in a free and democratic society.”349 Chief Justice Brian Dickson, writing for
the Court, noted that hate crimes worsened victims’ sense of self and
350
decreased victimized groups’ participation in public life. The Court’s disagreement was over whether the restriction on speech was proportional to
the objective. The majority felt it was proportional because of the minimal
value of hate speech expression,351 while the dissent was concerned that
prosecuting those convicted of hate speech may actually make them martyrs
and increase the frequency of hate speech.352

as reasonably possible); Pamela A. Chapman, The Politics of Judging: Section 1 of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 867, 886, 889–90 (1986) (analyzing the relationship
between Edward Books, Oakes and the least restrictive alternative test).
346.
Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 139. This element of the Oakes test first appeared in Justice
Dickson’s opinion in Regina v. Big M Drug Mart [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. This element of the Oakes
analysis necessarily “will vary depending on the circumstances,” Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 138, because
“courts will be required to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups.”
Id. at 139–40.
347.
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
348.
Id. at 725–34; id. at 826–42 (McLachlin, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Dickson noted
that:
Apart from rare cases where expression is communicated in a physically violent form, the
Court [has] viewed the fundamental nature of the freedom of expression as ensuring that
“if the activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and
prima facie falls within the scope of the guarantee.”
Id. at 729 (quoting Irwin Toy, Ltd. v. Quebec [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 969).
349.
Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 138–39.
350.
Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 701–08.
351.
Id. at 759–86.
352.
Id. at 852–53 (McLachlin, J., dissenting).
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The Virtues of Looking to Canadian Constitutional Law
on Hate Speech

What could the R.A.V. Court have learned from Keegstra? The
Canadian Court had comparative advantages because it had addressed the
issue earlier, made binding decisions, and observed how these decisions had
operated in the real world. The contextual differences between hate speech
in the Canadian context and hate speech in the American context are not
so great for the U.S. Supreme Court not to be able to learn anything. First
of all, the U.S. Supreme Court could have studied Keegstra for its Oakes
proportionality test, and considered adopting that test and applying it
in American hate speech cases. The Canadian Court faced the same
problem that the U.S. Court should have realized it faced: the battle
between liberty and equality. American sources were unclear in helping
the R.A.V. Court come up with a workable principle; it faced the same
issue as the Canadian Court, and therefore it could have adopted the Oakes
proportionality test. The Oakes proportionality test would be a helpful test
for American constitutional law; it embraces candor and realism, making it
an attractive principle and supporting the better solution virtues of refined
comparativism.
Also, the R.A.V. Court could have used the Canadian experience to
help it gauge some relevant constitutional facts. How has Canadian regulation of hate speech worked? If it has worked very well, then that might
make it a stronger argument that in the American context regulation of
hate speech is a “compelling end.” How have different Canadian regulations worked? Has Canada used other regulations that restrict speech less
than the St. Paul regulation? These types of comparative constitutional law
questions assist with the means-end examination in the American context.
The R.A.V. Court, for example, stated that “St. Paul has sufficient means
at its disposal to prevent such [hateful] behavior without adding the First
Amendment to the fire.”353 Looking at the Canadian experience with hate
speech regulation can prove whether or not this is the case—have other
Canadian regulations worked? Does St. Paul have “sufficient means”354 to
combat hate speech? The R.A.V. Court, as part of its means-end test, may
have been concerned, as the dissent in Keegstra was, that restricting hate
speech will increase its prevalence because it will make martyrs of those
prosecuted. Looking at the Canadian experience to see whether this is so can
be helpful evidence to discover if this worry about martyrdom has mate353.
354.

49:2

Fontana

R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).
Id.

Fontana Handcrafted.doc

(11/19/01 8:34 PM)

Refined Comparativism

607

rialized.355 The Canadian experience, and the accessibility of that experience to the American judge, would have helped overcome the type of
institutional limitations facing judges in hate speech cases. Judges in hate
speech cases inquire, for example, how hate speech affects minority communities. Because of the sociolegal changes discussed earlier,356 however, this
type of inquiry has become harder and harder for a judge to perform. A
court needs to rely on other sources to complete this inquiry—perhaps
lower courts, perhaps policymaking bodies, but also comparative constitutional experience.
More fundamentally, an analysis of the Keegstra case, especially after
comparing it to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in R.A.V., helps illuminate some of the assumptions behind the American reasoning. The R.A.V.
Court, or a court later deciding whether or not to apply R.A.V., could use
Keegstra to help it see the unstated assumptions of American jurisprudence
on hate speech.357 The American opinion paints no private actor as being
as threatening as the state. The R.A.V. Court insists that the “danger of
[state] censorship”358 is so great that any regulation focusing on the content
of communication will be viewed with great suspicion. Justice White
argues that the dangerous state is reason enough for the stringent overbreadth doctrine.359 In R.A.V., the majority argued that the ability of “the
Government . . . [to] drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the market360
place” could eventually lead to a state without civil liberties. By contrast,
the Canadian opinion views the state as pursuing, albeit in a less than

355.
The Canadian Supreme Court itself used comparative constitutional law to help it find
relevant constitutional facts. The dissent referred to the experience in pre-Nazi Germany that,
the dissent argued, featured an increase in hate speech following the criminalization of various
types of speech. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 854 (McLachlin, J., dissenting) (discussing the regulation of
various types of speech in pre-Hitler Germany). The court-appointed expert could use this comparative constitutional law data in the American context. Although the relationship between the
criminalization of certain behavior and its frequency is complex, and translating foreign data
about this even more complex, a judge could glean some insights from data through the use of
experts.
356.
Supra text accompanying notes 147–150.
357.
The assumptions behind R.A.V. would obviously not have been available for the
R.A.V. Court to analyze, but these assumptions that I am indicating were present in R.A.V. are
also present in all of the cases relevant to R.A.V. Thus, the R.A.V. Court could have looked to
these precedents and their assumptions and to Keegstra and its assumptions to help it determine
how to decide the case.
358.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395 (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991)).
359.
Id. at 411 (“‘The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted’ [by the
state].” (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973))).
360.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 436.
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perfect fashion, the public interest.361 Is this difference in attitudes towards
the state justified? Is the skeptical attitude towards the Orwellian state
manifested in R.A.V. as justified in an age of mass media scrutiny—or does
the pervasiveness of the administrative state make the American
government even more dangerous?362 This would have certainly been a
helpful subject of inquiry for an American court, one that would be
helpfully illuminated by an analysis of the Canadian opinion.
Second, R.A.V. paints the hateful speaker as harmless and idealistic,
describing the hate speech punished by the St. Paul ordinance as simply
discussion of “disfavored subjects”363 and as a “particular idea.”364 Those who
utter hate speech are simply the constitutional representatives for all
citizens who want to engage in speech or expressive activities. By contrast,
365
Keegstra paints hate speech in a much less flattering light. Third, R.A.V.
barely discusses the victim or victims of hate speech. Justice Scalia only
mentions, at the very end of his opinion, the Court’s “belief that burning a
cross in someone’s front yard is reprehensible.”366 The interest in promoting
hate speech laws, to the extent the R.A.V. Court recognizes one, is purely
367
private. Chief Justice Dickson’s opinion for the Keegstra majority, however, begins its analysis by mentioning why the regulation of hate speech
is important, and by mentioning certain public interests such as equal
participation in public life and democracy.368 Finally, the R.A.V. Court views
hate speech regulation as an extension of the subversive advocacy cases,
and as an example of a procedural, Schumpeterean model of democracy. If
the state silences anyone, it distorts the processes of democracy, the

361.
Hate speech legislation, directed by the state, is aimed at ensuring equal citizenship and
the participation of all in public life. See Charles Taylor, Can Canada Survive the Charter?, 30
ALBERTA L. REV. 427, 429 (1992) (noting that Canadians are happy with their social programs,
and that hate speech in particular ensures attention to the “collective provision”).
362.
Perhaps American history, as exemplified by the McCarthy era and the Alien and
Sedition Acts, serves as proof of the possibility of state censorship of all forms of speech. Canada,
however, has its own history of censorship. THOMAS R. BERGER, FRAGILE FREEDOMS: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DISSENT IN CANADA (1981).
363.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
364.
Id. at 393.
365.
The Keegstra opinion includes a discussion of the Nazi experience with hate. Regina v.
Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 770.
366.
R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 396. Justices that disagreed with Scalia’s opinion did paint a differing picture of hate speech. Id. at 402 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that cross burning is an
expression of violence and of racism).
367.
Indeed, even American scholarship supporting hate speech regulation seems to conceptualize the interests furthered by hate speech laws as private, individual freedoms rather than as
public interests. Supra note 336.
368.
Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 705–09.
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“marketplace of ideas,” and the competition of ideas.369 By contrast, the
Keegstra Court views democracy as substantive, and values such as equality
and the dignity of every human being as central to the democratic
project.370
The Keegstra Court also seems willing to grapple with the real-world
consequences of its decision in a way that the R.A.V. Court may not have
realized it was failing to do. The Keegstra Court rejected the clear and present danger test371 of American constitutional law,372 because it recognized
that serious harms might not be so identifiable immediately after harmful
speech. Harmful speech may have subtle effects that rely on fear and ignorance over time that may be hard to detect, but it may eventually cause
more harm than the harm the clear and present danger test attempts to prevent. Also, the Brandenburg v. Ohio373 requirement that violence must be
imminent to be proscribed may be objectionable. The Keegstra opinion
recognizes that different listeners respond to speech in different ways, and
that the type of violent, sudden response that Brandenburg focuses on may
privilege a particular type of macho reaction to speech without a concern
for a more serious yet subtle imminent harm.
The Court could have benefited from studying Keegstra, either before
or after writing its R.A.V. opinion, if for no other reason than that it might
help the Justices realize all of the unstated assumptions they are making,
and make them question whether those assumptions are justified. A later
U.S. Supreme Court relying on R.A.V. could also benefit by studying
Keegstra, because it will have an even greater ability to see unstated assumptions by comparing the opinion in R.A.V. with that in Keegstra. Seeing
these unstated assumptions may have led to a change in legal analysis, or
it simply may have led to a more realistic use of judicial rhetoric; either
way, it would be preferable to the opinion that does not use comparative
constitutional law. The Keegstra method of recognizing the clash between
liberty and equality and its balancing test have some of the virtues of
369.
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (3d ed.
1950) (stating that constitutional democracy is the “institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decision in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote”).
370.
Thus, perhaps Canadian constitutional democracy is closer to the German version
of a “militant democracy.” BVerfGE 5, 85 (139) (F.R.G.), translated in KOMMERS, supra note 9, at
223; see also Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1995).
371.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent.”).
372.
Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 740–44.
373.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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candor and frankness that have long been noted by American scholars in
conjunction with their praise of explicit constitutional balancing.374
2.

Criticisms of Looking to Canadian Constitutional Law
on Hate Speech

The critic of refined comparativism may have several problems with
using comparative constitutional law in the R.A.V. case. First, one could
argue that the Oakes proportionality test already exists in American constitutional law. While there are some cases that do generally deal with pro375
portionality, however, these cases do not deal with proportionality in the
context of hate speech as the Canadian cases do. The Canadian cases
address the concern of whether the regulation of hate speech may be excessive compared to its purpose, looking at equality, liberty, and a number of
other factors that the American opinions, to the extent they even do use
proportionality, ignore. Second, the contextual differences between
Canada and the United States are real but not fatal. Section 15 of the
Canadian Charter is much broader in scope and has wider substantive
protections and more prohibited grounds of discrimination than the
Fourteenth Amendment. This could have alerted the U.S. Supreme Court
not to borrow all aspects of Canadian hate speech cases, but it would not
defeat the entire enterprise of constitutional borrowing. No matter how
broad the protection for equality concerns, Canada found a way to balance
equality and liberty—how exactly it did that is one of the details the U.S.

374.
E.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 912–16 (1963); Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424
(1962); Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?—A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL.
L. REV. 729 (1963); Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme
Court’s Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755 (1963); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255–57; Wallace Mendelson, The First
Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1964); Wallace
Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821
(1962); Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673,
737–44 (1963). See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 972 (1987).
375.
E.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994). Balancing approaches roughly similar to proportionality have appeared in dormant commerce clause cases. E.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (finding that a
statute is acceptable “unless the burden imposed . . . is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.”).
In First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court in upholding the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 11
(1994), did use a form of balancing that resembles proportionality analysis. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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Supreme Court could have addressed when it decided how much of the
Canadian analysis it wanted to incorporate.
Canadian courts do play a different role in the Canadian constitutional system than American courts play in the American constitutional
system. The Non-Obstante Clause376 and other factors may mean that
Canadian courts have more authority to conduct balancing tests.377 The
United States, by contrast, may require “rules” rather than “standards”378
because it is a large, diverse republic with lower courts that rely on the
Supreme Court for guidance, and because there is a substantial history of
skepticism of judicial discretion. Again, however, this simply may limit the
scope of the constitutional borrowing rather than defeat the entire enterprise. Canadian courts may have more authority to conduct balancing tests,
but American courts already use balancing all of the time—this may simply
mean that American courts should conduct more narrow Oakes proportionality tests.
Similarly, perhaps differences in the roles of other legal institutional
actors may caution against using Keegstra in American hate speech cases.
As Mark Tushnet noted in his Yale Law Journal article on comparative
constitutional borrowing, there are substantial differences in the structure
of prosecutorial authority in Canada and the United States.379 Prosecution
decisions are made by a more centralized authority in Canada than in the
United States and therefore there is a greater risk in the United States of
singling out speech by racial minorities as the only hate speech that should
be prosecuted. This claim, however, does not seem particularly persuasive.
For one thing, the rise of the mass media means that prosecutorial abuses by
local officials in the United States will fairly frequently be publicized and
brought to the attention of central authorities and therefore prosecutions
might end up being filtered in the same way as they are in Canada. At a
more basic level, this criticism does not affect the above analysis of Keegstra
because the data about the potential for abuse—from Canada and from the
United States—can be used to shape the exact nature of hate speech regulation allowed in the United States. Canada provides data about the possibility of abuse given centralized prosecution structures, while the American

376.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. A (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 33.
377.
See, e.g., PATRICK MONAHAN, THE CHARTER, FEDERALISM AND THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA 30–32, 53–60, 78–79 (1987) (arguing that Canadian courts should conduct
balancing tests).
378.
Sullivan, supra note 64.
379.
Tushnet, supra note 12, at 1282–85.
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experience might provide alternate data about localized prosecution systems
and hate speech regulation.
A critic of using refined comparativism in this case may also worry that
Canadian culture has generally favored the mosaic version of multiculturalism while American culture has favored the melting pot version.380 In the
face of cultural diversity, Canada has favored at least occasional particularism and accommodation. Thus, for Canadian politicians such as Pierre
Trudeau, and for Canadian constitutionalists, accommodating Quebec or
the increase of immigration meant recognizing cultural difference. By contrast, in the United States, dealing with multiculturalism has meant
appealing to the universal rather than to the particular.
These possible differences do not obscure the fact, however, that both
countries are sociologically diverse, have internal language differences,
and have native populations that have historically been suppressed.381 The
Canadian mosaic may mean that the stringency of the test adopted into
the American context may differ, but it does not mean that the legal
principle cannot be borrowed or that the type of constitutional facts the
Canadian experience can provide are not relevant. American constitutional law, despite its claims of universality and categorical interpretive
techniques, has always incorporated some form of balancing tests in recent
times. This supposed distinctive American universalism is therefore more
imagined than real. Even without the benefits of refined comparativism
in the context of hate speech that result from actual doctrinal borrowing,
there are still many benefits to be gained by using refined comparativism,
even if this particular-universal contextual difference stands up after
examination: The range of background assumptions discussed above can
highlight what undergirds even an American constitutional universalism.
B.

Europe, Hate Speech, and Refined Comparativism

Individual countries on the Continent and supranational bodies on
the Continent have dealt with hate speech issues. Most famously, in the
Irving case in Germany the Constitutional Court held that orders prohibiting the convening of a conference at which the “revisionist historian” David
Irving was to speak did not violate Article 5(1) of the Basic Law.382 Article
380.
See, e.g., Lorraine Weinrib, Canada’s Charter: Rights Protection in the Cultural Mosaic, 4
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 395 (1996).
381.
For a more extensive analysis of the similarities between the United States and Canada
and its implications for constitutional law, see Alan F. Westin, The United States Bill of Rights and
the Canadian Charter: A Socio-Political Analysis, in THE U.S. BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 27 (William McKercher ed., 1983).
382.
Judgment of Apr. 23, 1994, Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE), 1994 N.J.W. 1779.
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5(1) guarantees freedom of expression in the following terms: “Everyone
shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by speech,
writing and pictures and freely to inform himself from generally accessible
sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of
broadcasting and films are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.”383
The boundaries are limited by paragraph two, which states that “these
rights are limited by the provision of the general laws, the provisions of law
for the protection of youth, and the right to inviolability of personal dignity.”384 Germany’s experience with the role of personal dignity in hate
speech cases could have been helpful for the R.A.V. Court in its search for
a workable principle. Also, the European Convention lists eleven limitations on the freedom of expression under Article 10(2).385 Its justifications
for these limitations, and how these limitations have worked in the courts
and in society, all could have been helpful subjects of study for the R.A.V.
Court.

VII. CRITICISMS
A. Normative Objections
1.

Completely Theorized Constitution

Refined comparativism is a contingent strategy of interpretation—
contingent on the recognition of ambiguity in the domestic constitutional
sources used to resolve a given constitutional case. If hard cases were relatively rare, then refined comparativism would not be used as much. A more
dramatic criticism of refined comparativism, however, would argue that
American constitutional sources do provide all of the answers in constitutional cases, even hard cases.386 The Calabresi opinion in United States
v. Then387 that advocated the borrowing of the suspensive veto from

383.
Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 5(1) (F.R.G.)
384.
Id. art. 10(2), art. 5(2).
385.
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 426 (Francis G. Jacobs & Robin
C.A. White eds., 2d ed. 1996). For each of the eleven exceptions in Article 10(2), there have
been a number of cases that use interesting principles to balance expression and other interests.
The experience of Europe with these eleven limitations could certainly have helped the R.A.V.
Court.
386.
Consider this the idea of the “completely theorized” Constitution, as opposed to Cass
Sunstein’s idea of “incompletely theorized agreements,” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING
AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35 (1996), and the partial Constitution. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993).
387.
56 F.3d 464, 466–69 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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Continental constitutional law388 might be criticized, for example, by
reference to Calabresi’s opinion in Quill v. Vacco,389 the right to die case.
Once Calabresi undertook a more extensive analysis of the domestic
constitutional sources in that case, he found an “answer” from American
sources and did not have to look abroad for a constitutional answer. The
constitutional theory that believes in a “completely theorized constitution,”
whether this totalism is drawn from text,390 history,391 structure,392 or national
experience,393 may have comparatively little use for refined comparativism.
Even within the completely theorized constitution, however, there is
room for the use of comparative constitutional law. On one hand, of
course, in their role as advice givers394 who use dicta to achieve various
ends, judges can cite to comparative constitutional law. More importantly,
however, even the completely theorized constitution will sometimes
run into ambiguity. A completely theorized account of federalism for
example, may find that our constitutional law clearly supports a “dual
federalism”395 understanding of our constitutional system. The totalist may
argue, therefore, that there is no need to look abroad for answers. But the
completely theorized constitution may not lead to a series of principles that
help judges deal with cases. Dual federalism, viewed through the lens of
388.
Id. at 468–89.
389.
80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996).
390.
E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
391.
E.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
392.
E.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969).
393.
Bruce Ackerman, for example, has written:
America is a world power, but does it have the strength to understand itself? Is it content, even now, to remain an intellectual colony, borrowing European categories to
decode the meaning of its national . . . identity?
....
To discover the Constitution, we must approach it without the assistance of guides
imported from another time and place. Neither Aristotle nor Cicero, Montesquieu nor
Locke, Harrington nor Hume, Kant nor Weber will provide the key. Americans have
borrowed much from such thinkers, but they have also built a genuinely distinctive pattern of constitutional thought and practice.
ACKERMAN, supra note 175, at 3. But see Richards, supra note 174, at 584–86. Ackerman has
elsewhere criticized the “emphatic provincialism” of American constitutional theory, Ackerman,
supra note 3, at 773, and argued that comparative constitutional law can provide “a formidable
fund of experience.” Id. at 775.
394.
Katyal, supra note 63.
395.
E.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (protecting states’ power to enforce their
own criminal laws); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (discussing the efficiency of
federal law enforcement); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), reh’g denied, 360 U.S. 907
(1959) (attempting to preserve the balance of prosecutorial powers between federal and state governments); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (protecting the government’s power to
fully prosecute an offense that violates both federal and state law).
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purely American sources of constitutional meaning, can lead to a number of
different judicial principles. However, combining these American sources
of constitutional meaning with the additional data points provided by comparative constitutional law can help a judge see how different principles
actually work.
More fundamentally, however, it is rather implausible to argue for
the completely theorized constitution. The originalist account for complete
theorization must consider the Founders’ limited ability to foresee the
future,396 and the inherently incomplete nature of their political compromises that led to the Constitution.397 This political compromise was
partly attributable to the circumstances in which the Founders operated—
in a situation of crisis with serious time constraints.398 The textualist must
also account for the inevitable generality of the constitutional text, whether
read in clause-bound fashion399 or intratextually.400
2.

Cultural Particularism

The particularist may argue that American constitutional experience
has been distinctly American, and to use comparative constitutional
sources violates the constitutive nature of American constitutional law.401

396.
James Madison, speaking in the first Congress in opposing the creation of the national
bank, stated that: “It is not pretended that every insertion or omission in the Constitution is the
effect of systematic attention. This is not the character of any human work, particularly the work
of a body of men.” 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1899 (1791) (quoting James Madison).
397.
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 177–78 (1796) (“The constitution has
been considered as an accommodating system; it was the effect of mutual sacrifices and concessions; it was the work of compromise.”). Justice Joseph Story concluded that the Constitution was
therefore incomplete, and “no uniform rule of interpretation can be applied to it . . . [it] positively
demand[s] . . . many modifications in its actual application to particular clauses.” Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 610 (1842).
398.
Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364,
370–71 (1995). Recent foreign experiences drafting constitutions confirms the time-bound
nature of the practice. E.g., A.E. Dick Howard, The Indeterminacy of Constitutions, 31 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 383, 396 (calling the Polish “Little Constitution” of 1992 a “compromise” constitution); Howard & Fontana, supra note 18 (discussing the time pressures facing constitution drafters in central and eastern Europe after 1989).
399.
Cf. ELY, supra note 89, at 11–41 (criticizing “clause-bound” textual constitutional
analysis).
400.
Amar, supra note 390.
401.
E.g., William P. Alford, On the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law,
61 WASH. L. REV. 945, 946–47 (1986) (arguing that “assumptions and values . . . shared
[by society]” constitute our law and therefore make legal borrowing undesirable); George P.
Fletcher, Constitutional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 739 (1993) (arguing that hard
constitutional cases reflect an “element of yearning” in a culture and therefore it is problematic to
borrow legal solutions); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Cultural Contingency of

49:2

Fontana

Fontana Handcrafted.doc

(11/19/01 8:34 PM)

616

49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 539 (2001)

Refined comparativism, however, does not use comparative constitutional
law in such a radical way as to displace the centrality of American sources.
It creates a workable judicial principle by looking at American sources,
deciding that theses sources lead to a particular concept, and affixing
a particular comparative conception to that concept. The institutions that
American courts are borrowing from are not that different from our
courts—they are engaged in some of the same basic tasks. Constitutional
courts around the world are all reflective institutions. In a very real sense,
they represent political man writ large writing and thinking about where to
draw the line between the liberties of the individual and the power of the
state. The cultural linkages between these constitutional courts and our
courts are even more obvious now than they have been in the past.
Whether or not refined comparativism would have been justifiable eighty
years ago, the constitutive nature of constitutional identity sketched out
earlier402 makes the constitutional law of other countries part of our cultural
fabric as well. Because a growing number of citizens come from parts of the
world whose traditions are not reflected in traditional American constitutional law, refined comparativism is a strategy of inclusion and of giving
expression to our culture through the use of comparative constitutional law.
B.

Pragmatic Objections

1.

Pragmatic Particularism

Comparative law has long featured a debate about the degree to which
the transplantation of legal rules from one legal system to another will
work.403 Most famously, Otto Kahn-Freund employed Montesquieu’s view404
Constitutional Categories, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 865, 877 (1993) (noting the centrality of “cultural
experience and cultural history” in constitutional law).
402.
Supra text accompanying notes 161–162.
403.
E.g., Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1, 1–2 (1997). Oscar Chase argues that
the relationship between national culture and dispute resolution processes . . . takes on
new urgency with the acceleration of globalization . . . . [I]nstitutional differences . . . implicate and reflect different and deeply held attitudes about the appropriate
relationship between individuals and authority. [For example, t]he German system . . . reflects a willingness to accept structures of authority that are inimical to the
more individualistic Americans.
Id.; see also John H. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 41, 41 (1997) (arguing that Chase wrongly bases his views on “ethnic stereotypes”).
404.
1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS ch. 3 (Geneva,
Barrillot & Fils 1748) (“[The political and civil laws of each nation] should be so closely tailored
to the people for whom they are made, that it would be pure chance [un grand hazard] if the laws
of one nation could meet the needs of another.”).
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that law will not be easily transferable from country to country.405 Alan
Watson argues that Kahn-Freund misunderstands the transplantability of
legal rules.406 In the context of refined comparativism, however, this debate
about the workability of legal transplants does not appear as relevant.407
First of all, refined comparativism essentially involves courts making very
broad and general rules, whose specific content will be filled in by subsequent cases coming from the American social context.408 Kahn-Freund and
Watson, as did many others, viewed legal transplants primarily in terms of
the transplant of legislation, ignoring Roscoe Pound’s admonishing instruction that “a fruitful comparative law . . . has to do much more than set side
by side sections of codes or . . . legislation.”409
Also, it must be kept in mind that refined comparativism does not
contemplate the type of radical, wholesale transplants that Kahn-Freund
and Watson address. A refined comparativist judge only uses comparative
constitutional law after deciding that contextual factors and cultural differences will not impinge on the transferability of the constitutional principle
or fact, assisted very often by a comparative law expert. If the refined comparativist judge decides to use comparative constitutional law but still
remains concerned about the transferability of the constitutional principle
or fact, the judge has the power over precedent to mitigate possible
problems—the judge can refuse to adopt wholesale the precedents of
another country and can just adopt one particular case, and in the domestic
context can decide that the case using comparative constitutional law
should not have precedential effect for a certain period of time, or will
receive less precedential power.410 There can be refined comparativist
“maximalists” and refined comparative “minimalists.” Furthermore, the
impact of differing social contexts on the transferability of legal rules has
taken on a different dynamic given social conditions in the early twentyfirst century. The United States is relatively heterogeneous, and the
geographic space affected by a refined comparativist decision may be more
405.
Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 7
(1974). These concerns about the workability of foreign legal rules might be heightened in a postRealist world, in which almost everyone agrees that legal texts are unclear and require reference
to extratextual sources, extratextual sources that are inherently culturally contingent.
406.
WATSON, supra note 4, at 95–96.
407.
There might be other “intertextual” sources that would be more relevant and less subject to the problems of particularism. These sources, such as state constitutions, may be a better
source of comparative insight, but often they too will not yield a clear answer, thus still making
the case before a court a “hard” case.
408.
When a court faces a case that involves much more specific and idiosyncratic action, it
should not use comparative constitutional law. Supra text accompanying note 96.
409.
Roscoe Pound, Comparative Law in Space and Time, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 70, 75 (1955).
410.
Supra note 90.
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culturally similar to a part of another country than it is to another part of
the United States. It is precisely this fact that makes lower courts the better
laboratories for trying refined comparativist experiments—for using
comparative constitutional law when its benefits may not be as clear.
2.

Judicial Application

Another criticism of refined comparativism would focus on the ability
of judges to play the role visualized by refined comparativism. American
legal education does not provide judges with the type of comparative constitutional training that they need. Furthermore, non-English speaking
411
countries must have their legal materials translated, most judges speak
412
only English, and translation always involves interpretation. This may
result in an Anglophile refined comparativism,413 with the best example
411.
The issues raised by legal translation are rarely discussed, with some notable exceptions.
E.g., Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 577 (D. Mass. 1985) (comparing the “mere clerical
function” of a computer programmer writing code to someone translating “any foreign language”);
Sacco, supra note 4, at 20 (“The complexity of the problems involved in legal translation makes
the carelessness with which they are approached seem incredible.”); Peter W. Schroth, Legal
Translation, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 47, 47 (Supp. 1986) (“Despite its great practical importance, legal
translation is little discussed; despite its difficulty, it is frequently assigned to translators without
legal training. Plainly both the importance and the difficulty are commonly underestimated.”).
412.
John G. Sprankling & George R. Lanyi, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law in American
Courts, 19 STAN. J. INT’L L. 3, 35 (1983); see also SUSAN BERK-SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL
COURTROOM: COURT INTERPRETERS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1990). There are plenty
of examples of a judge using his or her knowledge of a foreign language to translate relevant
materials from a foreign language by him or herself. E.g., In re The Prahova, 38 F. Supp. 418
(S.D. Cal. 1941).
413.
This is particularly true when one considers what materials law libraries are likely to
hold—primarily the materials of wealthy countries, who will disproportionately speak English and
have ample money to publish their judicial opinions. Comparative law scholarship has reflected
this ethnocentrism. For example, Japanese legal studies receive relatively little attention in comparative law. As Frank K. Upham has discovered:
In the forty-six years from 1950 to the middle of 1996, the AJCL [American Journal of
Comparative Law] published approximately 1450 book reviews. Sixty percent of reviewed
books were written in English and the rest in other European languages, including thirtyfive percent in German or French. One book was in a non-European language,
Chinese . . . . Of over 1100 articles during this period, twenty-six or 2.32 percent
concerned Japan. There were twenty-seven about China. In the same period there were
ninety-one and seventy-four articles about Germany and France, respectively. Europe as
a whole occupied 41.12 percent versus 8.67 percent for Asia, including South Asia . . . .
Frank K. Upham, The Place of Japanese Legal Studies in American Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 639, 641.
This may be changing now that publishers like Kluwer, Nijhof, Oceana, Butterworths, and
Mohr have published comparative constitutional law materials. There has also been a proliferation of American scholarly publications on comparative and international law. Cf. Roger
C. Cramton, “The Most Remarkable Institution”: The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 8
(1986). The Internet, Lexis, and Westlaw provide instant access to foreign materials translated
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being Bowers v. Hardwick,414 in which the Court for no good reason focused
only on English language materials in performing its comparative constitutional law analysis.415 In short, even if refined comparativism is a good
idea, can judges pull it off?416
The first and most important thing to remember about refined comparativism is the role of experts.417 Judges have already been immersing
themselves in foreign law as the American economy has globalized,418 and
have done so on many occasions with the assistance of foreign law
419
experts. These foreign law experts should have the ability to both speak
the language of the host country and should have some background or
experience with that country’s legal system. Translation, as Lawrence
Lessig has noted,420 involves both familiarity and equivalence in meaning.
into English, and allow judges and scholars to more easily communicate with their foreign counterparts. M.D. Kirby, The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights by Reference to International
Human Rights Norms, 62 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 514, 516 (noting the increasing ability of courts to
look to foreign sources with the improvement of contemporary technology).
414.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
415.
This is reminiscent of Justice Black’s argument that there is no reason, in looking to
what rights were incorporated against the states after the Civil War, to focus only on Englishspeaking countries. Supra note 240.
416.
I take no position about the impact refined comparativism would have in general on
American constitutional jurisprudence. It is not clear whether borrowing from the constitutional
law of other countries would have any effect on the ideological position of American constitutional law, or whether it would move it to the left or to the right. Because this is a method
Article—arguing for a particular interpretive technique—I consider the effect on outcomes, as
long as the outcomes will be reasonable, outside the scope of this Article. For general discussions
of the need to consider systemic consequences when evaluating questions of interpretive method
in constitutional law, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 535 (1999); and Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 636 (1999).
417.
Add to this the role of the litigants. Because refined comparativism is an idea for the
federal courts, and one that will be more relevant for federal appellate courts, litigants appearing
before the court will disproportionately be resource-heavy and have the ability to hire translators
and employ their own experts—if they do not speak foreign languages themselves. Those being
represented by lawyers with fewer research resources would be assisted by the professionalization of
comparative constitutional law that I addressed earlier. Cf. Robel, supra note 90, at 946–55 (discussing the impact of unpublished opinions on the research abilities of less well-funded parties
to litigation); supra text accompanying notes 105–108.
418.
See generally David S. Clark, The Use of Comparative Law by American Courts (I), 42
AM. J. COMP. L. 23, 40 (Supp. 1994) (cataloging the judicial use of comparative materials
in international law, international civil procedure, service of process of foreign defendants, civil
discovery of evidence in foreign countries, choice of foreign law in civil cases, enforcement of
foreign country civil judgments, and criminal proceedings). There are many areas of American
law that rely on American judicial analysis of foreign law. E.g., United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d
1419, 1424–27 (11th Cir. 1997) (analyzing foreign law to determine the possibility of foreign
prosecution after the deportation of a litigation party); United States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. 588,
592–97 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), rev’d, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (same).
419.
Supra note 122.
420.
Lessig, supra note 190.
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Lessig defines familiarity as “develop[ing] modes of thinking that reconnect
[one] . . . with the dynamic field of words, modes of thinking that will allow
them to explore meaning associations within a word and making connections created by words in a specific context.”421 Moreover, the skilled
comparativist must be able to analyze comparative constitutional law
within the context of general institutional practices. One of the key
contributions of translation theory in the 1980s was “the discovery of the
importance of first establishing what norms govern translation behavior
before analyzing specific translations,”422 as “every instant of the translation
process is governed by norms.”423
The judge comparing legal systems is performing the task of comparison
and analogy at the heart of legal reasoning.424 With the assistance of an
expert (preferably one schooled in the language, culture, and law of the
foreign country), or even without one, this process of comparison and
analogical reasoning is nothing new to the judge. The judge of the future,
and the lawyer of today, has practiced law or taught law in the era of
globalization, when a lawyer must be familiar with some aspects of foreign
law.425 The judge has practiced the art of comparing the laws of different
jurisdictions on many other occasions. Judges interpret statutes by looking
426
to the laws of many different states, have to apply foreign law in many

421.
Id. at 1196 (quoting Rainer Schulte & John Biguenet, Introduction to THEORIES OF
TRANSLATION (Rainer Schulte & John Biguenet eds., 1992)).
422.
EDWIN GENTZLER, CONTEMPORARY TRANSLATION THEORIES 136 (1993).
423.
Id.
424.
Cf. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S.
Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43 (1998). Thus, many of the criticisms of the proposals
by those like Posner that judges attempt to use social science do not apply. With the benefit of
translation, technological advancement, and experts, refined comparativist judges do not face the
extent of problems that social science judges do. For a discussion of the limitations facing judges
attempting to perform nonlegal analysis, see, for example, Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony
and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998). Posner, the paradigmatic example of an
interdisciplinary constitutional theorist, makes several errors in his interdisciplinary analysis from
time to time. Martha C. Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1782 (1998)
(criticizing Posner’s Holmes Lectures for mischaracterizing elements of academic philosophy); cf.
Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79 (1992).
425.
In re Roel, 144 N.E.2d 24, 28 (N.Y. 1957) (“When counsel . . . are admitted to the Bar
of the State . . . they are responsible to the client . . . to know the law of . . . foreign State[s].”).
For a discussion of changes in technology and publishing that make it easier to be a refined comparativist, see supra note 413. The difficulty in being a comparativist at all, however, does counsel
in favor of refined comparativist judges sticking to formal legal texts. Supra note 4.
426.
One example of this is “law canvassing,” supra note 74, when a judge looks at the law
of many states to make a particular conclusion. In a similar vein, for examples of cases interpreting one statute in light of other statutes from different jurisdictions, see, for instance, Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978); and Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Some
cases take this to an extreme: In Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court
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international business cases,427 and so are used to all forms of comparative
legal reasoning. Indeed, many courts in the world are quite used to (and
have been quite successful at) creating a body of integrated and coherent
law that combines the laws of different jurisdictions; the European Court of
Human Rights, for instance, and other supranational adjudicatory bodies
around the world, are quite experienced at practicing comparative
constitutional law.428 Being aided in this process by experts and by the
arguments of litigants about comparative constitutional law, a judge will
have a wealth of different resources and interpretations of comparative law
429
to rely upon in reaching a decision.

looked at the prejudgment attachment rules of all fifty states, comparing them and contrasting
them at a very specific and nuanced level. Id. app. at 24–26.
Indeed, a true understanding of comparative knowledge demonstrates that Justice Scalia is
not quite the opponent of using comparative constitutional law that he might at first glance
appear to be. As discussed supra note 40, Scalia does use comparative constitutional law in some
of his opinions. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 381 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the prohibition of anonymous campaign speech in foreign democracies
supports prohibition in the United States). Even beyond that, however, Justice Scalia has elsewhere advocated the use of original intent as the lodestar of constitutional interpretation. Scalia,
supra note 391. Properly understood, original intention analysis is itself a form of comparative
analysis (albeit a form of temporal comparativism rather than the geographical comparativism of
refined comparativism).
427.
Supra note 418. These are just some examples of how judges have already been performing comparative legal analysis. Judges also have been forced to interpret treaties from different jurisdictions, which involves not only interpreting a treaty but also other national laws that
relate to treaties. Judges have also had to supervise discovery taking place in other countries.
Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1995).
428.
These courts that themselves have lots of experience in being comparativist could provide a wealth of knowledge for American courts utilizing the refined comparativist method.
429.
There might be a possible distributive critique of refined comparativism. By making
comparative constitutional law relevant to deciding constitutional cases, the cost of litigation
increases. Litigants with fewer resources will not have the ability to effectively research comparative constitutional law, let alone hire experts or translators. This mirrors some of the debates
about unpublished opinions having precedential value. Lauren K. Robel argues that not publishing opinions poses problems for poor litigants. She claims that wealthier litigants are more likely
to know about unpublished opinions and thus are more likely to be able to spot trends invisible to
litigants with fewer resources. Robel, supra note 90, at 946–55.
I have several thoughts about this criticism. First, lawyers will be able to find published and
online copies of opinions and studies from the countries that will supply most of the comparative
constitutional insight for refined comparativist judges. This is true for a number of reasons. First,
the countries with the most extensive constitutional law are the most relevant under refined
comparativism because they have compiled a lot of information about the operation of their
constitutional rules. As it works out, the countries with the most constitutional data also are
significantly more likely to make relevant materials widely available. Also, these countries with
long constitutional traditions are most likely to be the ones relevant under refined comparativism
because they have the fewest number of social and legal differences compared to the United
States. So, countries like Germany, France, and even South Africa and India now publish their
opinions in many places, as do scholars of their courts.
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Moreover, the refined comparativist judge is not doing all that much
with comparative constitutional law. It is true that for a source of meaning
to be persuasive in the way I have described comparative constitutional law,
one must first understand the source. But remember, the refined comparativist judge is just making very broad rules430 and does not need to know
everything about the constitutional law he or she is borrowing. Even when
using American sources, judges do not know all that much. When the
Warren Court decided Brown v. Board of Education,431 it may have known
something about the South, but did it really know what would happen in
the years following its decision? The refined comparativist judge is performing a similar task: announcing broad rules, and waiting to see how they
actually work. The basic seed is coming from abroad; the seed is growing in
American soil.

CONCLUSION
American constitutional law must enter the new century with a willingness to deal with a rapidly changing world. All around, countries are
developing sophisticated judicial systems with talented judges who write
cogent and compelling opinions. At the same time, at home, America is
becoming a multicultural country unlike anything ever seen before on the
planet. Will American constitutional law—particularly American constitutional scholarship—deal with these changes, or will it remain in the last
century?
Another response to this distributive concern would be to implement in constitutional adjudication what courts have done for other areas of American adjudication—allow court-appointed
experts to play a larger role to make up for inequalities between parties, or have the courts actually
help pay for individual litigants’ experts. This will be complemented by the professionalization of
comparative constitutional law discussed elsewhere in the Article. Supra text accompanying 105–
108. This would make relevant research materials more widely available.
A final response to the distributive critique of refined comparativism is that it seems to misunderstand the probable operation of refined comparativism. Constitutional cases that present
challenging “hard cases” and that will lead to abstract rules (remember, of course, that refined
comparativism requires a judge to be issuing a general principle if he or she is to use comparative
constitutional law) will usually feature litigants who have lots of resources. Litigants in cases in
which comparative constitutional law is relevant will disproportionately be wealthy and experienced because “hard cases” will almost always occur at the federal appellate and Supreme Court
level.
430.
The refined comparativist judge also has the power to be a “refined comparativst
maximalist” or a “refined comparativist minimalist”—if the judge is worried about how little he or
she knows about another country, or is worried about how using comparative constitutional law
will translate into the American context, the decision can apply just to the facts of the one case
before the court, the court can decide the issue but agree to revisit it anew to see how the use of
comparative constitutional law worked, and so on. Supra note 90 and accompanying text.
431.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Refined comparativism offers a workable system for the American
judge of the new century. Because the law values experience over experimentation, especially at the appellate level, judges will be helped in
becoming refined comparativists by the experience of foreign countries and
by the (generally unrecognized) tradition of American constitutional opinions using comparative constitutional insights. As countries around the
world continue to move towards liberal democratic constitutionalism, and
judges at home inevitably look to these countries’ insights, that reservoir of
experience will only increase. Indeed, given the increasing contact
between judges from around the world, and the increasing availability of
comparative legal materials, citing to comparative constitutional law seems
inevitable. It would be much better, therefore, to recognize this, and talk
about when it might be helpful and when it might not be so helpful. Such
is the agenda for the twenty-first century American constitutionalist—and I
hope refined comparativism is a good start.
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